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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you have been living with the woman you love for the last two years
but are not yet married. You work for an airline company and have been flying for
free for several years. Now, you want your partner to receive the same benefits.
You should not have a problem because other employees' partners fly for free despite the fact they are not married. You walk into your boss's office with all of the
proper paperwork, but he refuses to give you the spouse travel pass. "Why?" you
ask. It is solely because you and your partner are both female. Even though some
employers are beginning to provide benefits to gay and lesbian partners,' many
still do not.2

1. See, e.g., Evan Ramstad, IBM Extends Benefits to Homosexuals, RocKY MOUNTAIN
NEws, Sept. 20, 1996, at 1B (noting that IBM, one of the largest international companies,
announced in the fall of 1996 that it would extend health benefits and other benefits to partners of gay and lesbian employees).
2. See Sherwood Ross, Gay Partner Benefits Spreading Rapidly in Workplace,
REuTERs Bus. REP., Nov. 20, 1995 (reporting that according to Common Ground, a work
place education and diversity training consulting firm, there are only 428 companies in the
United States that provide domestic partner benefits and that for every company providing
benefits there are at least twenty companies in which gay and lesbian employees are asking
for these benefits).
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Now imagine that you and your partner decide to marry legally in Hawaii?
Upon your return to Richmond, you go to your boss's office asking for the spouse
travel pass, this time armed with a marriage license from Hawaii. Your state, Virginia, however, does not recognize same-sex marriages.4 Your boss denies your
request again, and you sue. What can a court in Richmond do?
This hypothetical is not yet possible in the United States because Judge Chang
in Hawaii issued a stay that prevents the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex
couples until after the Hawaii Supreme Court hears the appeal of Baehr v. Lewin.'
A situation, however, is occurring in Great Britain where a lesbian sued her employer for travel benefits. This case, Grant v. South-West Trains, Ltd., is currently
pending before the European Court of Justice,6 and recently, the Advocate-General
of the European Court of Justice delivered his opinion on this case.
In Grant,Lisa Grant sued her employer, South-West Trains ("SWT"), formerly
a division of British Rail, because it denied her lesbian partner spouse travel benefits.' SWT admits that it denied Lisa Grant this perquisite because she and her
3. See Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394 (Hawaii Cir. Ct., Dec. 3, 1996) available in,
LEXIS, Hottop Library, Extra File (holding that it was a violation of the state constitution
to deny same-sex couples marriage applications).
4. See Fearinga Toehold for Gay Marriages,Conservatives Rush to Bar the Door,
N.Y. TmES, Mar. 6, 1996, at A13 (describing the trend among states to adopt laws that
deny recognition of same-sex marriages); see also Lisa Keen, Good News, Bad News on
Marriage:HawaiiSupreme Court Rejects an Attempt to Amend State Constitution, WASH.
BLADE, Mar. 28, 1997, at I (listing states, including Virginia, which passed laws denying
state recognition of same-sex marriages from any other state). Today twenty states have
banned the recognition of same-sex marriages from other states. See id at 23.
In addition to these twenty states, there are similar bills that have either passed or are
pending in either the house or senate in state legislatures in another twenty-four states. See
id Interestingly, only three state legislatures so far have rejected this type of legislation. See
id at 1, 23. The United States Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act and President
Clinton signed it into law. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat.
2419 (1996). Section 7 defines marriage as "only a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife" and defines spouse as a person of the opposite sex of the other
party in the marriage. Id at § 7.
5. See The Week in Review, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Dec. 8, 1996, at A21 (noting that the
Hawaii Circuit Court ruled that the state could not deny same-sex couples marriage licenses
and Circuit Court Judge Chang ordered a stay until the state supreme court rules on the issue).
6. See Case C-249/96, Grant v. South-West Trains, Ltd., Written Observations on Behalf of Lisa Jacqueline Grant, Dec. 17, 1996 [hereinafter Grant's Written Observations].
7. See id at 2-3 (outlining the reasons why Lisa Grant brought the case against her
employer); see also Michael Fleet, Ban on FreeRail Travelfor Lesbian 'Is Unjust', DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), May 3, 1996, at 10 (reporting that Lisa Grant brought suit against
SWT because she was denied a travel pass for her lesbian companion); Sarah Boseley, Lesbian 'Victim ofBias by Rail Firm' Cherie Blair Takes on Case ofRail Travel Perk as Test
for English and EuropeanLaw on Sex Discrimination,GUARDIAN (London), May 3, 1996,
at 4 (reporting that Lisa Grant's suit focuses on sex discrimination by her employer because
SWT failed to provide Grant with a travel pass for her lesbian companion); BR Clerk Seeks
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partner are lesbians.' While the discrimination laws of both the European Community and Great Britain provide for protection from employment discrimination
based on sex, these discrimination laws, as of yet, do not provide protection based
on sexual orientation.9 Therefore, Lisa Grant argues that SWT discriminated based
on sex, which is illegal under the Treaty establishing the European Economic
Community and under British law.' °
This case is truly a landmark case for gays and lesbians." For many years, gays
and lesbians in Europe have sought equal rights from the European Community
institutions as well as from various treaty organizations to which most European
countries are signatories. 2 The Grant case is uniquely situated to provide gays and
lesbians equal protection in the workplace as well as to raise a discussion of the
issues surrounding same-sex unions in other areas such as immigration and probate
law.
This Comment provides reasons why the European Court of Justice should find
in favor of Lisa Grant. Part II of this Comment provides an overview of the
framework of the European Community institutions and the various European intergovernmental organizations, reviewing each institution's political ability and
efforts to provide equal treatment for gays and lesbians. Part III describes the
European Court of Justice and certain aspects of the Court that make it uniquely
situated and prepared to assist gays and lesbians. Part IV reviews the treaties of the
Travel Rightsfor Lesbian Partner,INDEPENDENT (London), May 3, 1996, at 9 (noting that

Lisa Grant argued that "[p]artners of gay British Rail employees should have the same
rights to cut-price tickets as heterosexual lovers.").
8. See Grant's Written Observations, supra note 6, at 2-3 (describing how SWT denied Lisa Grant a travel pass for her lesbian partner). SWT "claims an entitlement to discriminate against Lisa Grant and her partner and asserts that Community Law provides no
constraint or protection in the circumstances of the present case." Id. at 8.
9. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, art. 119, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EC Treaty] (protecting against sex discrimination only);
Sex Discrimination Act of 1975, ch. 65, § l(a) (Eng.) (describing sex discrimination as
treating a woman less favorably than a man on the ground of her sex, but not providing for
protection based on sexual orientation); see also Grant's Written Observations, supra note
6, at 8 (outlining Lisa Grant's argument that SWT's actions constituted sex discrimination).
10. See Grant's Written Observations, supra note 6, at 8 (indicating Lisa Grant's reliance on Article 119 of the EC Treaty, which provides protection from sex discrimination);
see also supra note 9 (describing the limits of both the European Community and British
protections against sex discrimination).
11. See Andrew Clapham & J.H.H. Weiler, Lesbian and Gay Men in the European
Community Legal Order, in HOMOSEXUALrIY: A EUROPEAN CoMMUNITY ISSUE 21 (Kees
Waaldijk & Andrew Clapham eds., 1993) (noting that the stakes are extremely high for any
case like Lisa Grant's, which reaches the European Court of Justice); see also Paul Edwards, Gay Test Case Goes to Euro Court,PRESS Ass'NNEWsFILE, July 22, 1996, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File (referring to this as a "landmark" case).
12. See generally PETER TATCHELL, EUROPE INTHE PINK: LESBIAN & GAY EQUALITY IN
THE NEW EUROPE 15-38 (1992) (describing the progress of the gay and lesbian movement in

the various European Community institutions as well as European intergovernmental treaty
organizations).
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European Community, focusing on the goals and objectives of the European
Community. The argument in this part indicates that the denial of legal protection
for gays and lesbians and the failure to recognize same-sex unions hinder the
Community's ability to reach its goals. Part V reviews the history of the gay and
lesbian civil rights movement in Europe and focuses on the recognition of samesex partnerships. Each part also indicates the important role of the European Court
of Justice and provides compelling reasons why the European Court of Justice
should find in favor of Lisa Grant. Part VI reviews the arguments and legal analysis in Grant.Part VII reviews the recent Advocate-General's opinion delivered on
September 30, 1997, which suggests that the European Court of Justice respond in
favor of Lisa Grant. Part VIII combines the conclusions reached in each previous
part and articulates the reasons why the European Court of Justice should find for
Lisa Grant.

II. OVERVIEW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 3 INSTITUTIONS'
FRAMEWORK AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL TREATY
ORGANIZATIONS
Gays and lesbians have lobbied the European Community and intergovernmental organizations, 4 with mixed results.'" One reason for this mixed success is
that the institutions that are willing to help gays and lesbians lack the political

13. See Jos'mHnE SHAW, EUROPEAN ColMuNrr LAW 5 (1993) (noting that the European Union has no legal personality). Because the member states established the European
Court of Justice as part of the European Community, this Comment refers to the Community as such, as opposed to the European Union. The Comment recognizes, however, that
the Maastricht Treaty established the framework of the European Union, which encompasses the European Community Treaties. See also EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 4 (establishing the four European Community institutions discussed in this Comment).
14. See, e.g., TATCHELL, supra note 12, at 15-38 (describing the gay and lesbian community's relationship with the European Community institutions); see also Alexandra
Duda, The Council of Europe and What It Can Do For Gay Men and Lesbians, in ILGA
EuROIErrLE
30, Jan. 1995 (visited Sept. 10, 1997) <http.//fglb.qrd.org:8080
/fqrdlassocsilgaleuroletter/30.hmtl#EU> [hereinafter ILGA EUROLETERM 30] (discussing
the International Lesbian and Gay Association's ("ILGA") lobbying of the Council of
Europe and other inter-governmental organizations since the ILGA was established in 1978;
ILGA's EU Policy, in ILGA EUROLErrER 30, supra (describing the ILGA's plans to continue to lobby the European Community institutions). "ILGA should influence the institutions of the European Union in order to gain full equality for lesbians and gays in the European Union as well as in member states." Id
15. See TATCHELL, supra note 12, at 17-19 (describing the European Commission's
apathetic and negative responses to gay and lesbian lobbying); see also EU Intergovernmental Conference on a New Treaty, in ILGA EuRoLETrmR 39, Feb. 1996 (visited Sept. 10,
1997) <http//fglb.qrd.org:8080/fqrdassocsilgaeuroletter/39.html> [hereinafter ILGA
EuRoiz-rm 39) (describing the Danish National Organization for Gays and Lesbians' lobbying of the European Parliament).
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power to implement pro-gay or pro-equality changes.' The institutions that have
the power, however, tend to be too preoccupied with economic issues to use their
power to promote equality for gays and lesbians.' 7 The European Court of Justice
possesses the right mix of power and willingness to improve the situation for gays
and lesbians in, at the very least, the workplace. 8 For these reasons, Grant is a
relatively rare opportunity for a dramatic, positive change for gays and lesbians in
Europe.

A. OVERVIEW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
In 1957, a group of six nations signed the Treaty of Rome ("EC Treaty") establishing a European Economic Community, similar to earlier economic agreements
such as the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Atomic Energy

Community. 9 This new European Economic Community was often considered the
"everything else" community." The EC Treaty established the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, and the European
Court of Justice.2' Defining this organization and the relationship
between the in22
stitutions of the European Community is difficult at best.

The European Community resembles neither the typical governing structure of
an international organization, in that its institutions exercise sovereign powers
transferred by the member states, nor the institutional framework of a modem parliamentary democracy.' It is, for example, not possible to identify a clear separation of powers between the legislative and the executive functions.24 While difficult to describe, each institution that makes up the European Community has a
different willingness and political ability to assist gays and lesbians in achieving
protections such as workplace discrimination protection or recognition of same-sex
partnerships.

16. See infra Part II.B (describing the limited political power of the gay-friendly European Parliament).
17. See infra notes 38-67 and accompanying text (describing the power of the Council
of Ministers and the European Commission but noting their resistance to enact legislation
that will help gays and lesbians in the European Community).
18. See infra Part III; see also infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text (describing
the freedom of the European Court of Justice to promote equal rights for gays and lesbians).
19. See SHAW, supra note 13, at 4 (discussing the creation of the European Community). The Treaty of Rome is often referred to as the European Economic Community
Treaty. It is referred to as the "EC Treaty" in this Comment.
20. Id.
21. See EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 4 (establishing these institutions); see also SHAW,
supra note 13, at 7.
22. See id. at 51 (describing the intertwined relationships between the European Community institutions).
23. See SHAW, supra note 13, at 3 (providing an introduction to European Community
law).
24. See SHAW, supra note 13, at 51.
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B. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
The European Parliament is a body of elected officials from the member countries, which serves a quasi-legislative role.' Often the Parliament is limited to unenforceable recommendations and statements. 26 Of the four European Community
institutions, the European Parliament is the weakest.27 Even though the European
Parliament's power has expanded under the Single European Act, and more recently under the Maastricht Treaty on European Union ("TEU")27 to include cooperation and co-decision rights in the Community's legislative process, including
veto powers," it is still relatively powerless in the European Community' Despite
this lack of power, or perhaps because of this lack of power, members of the European Parliament ("MEPs") speak out more frequently on gay and lesbian issues
than members of the other European Community institutions.3 In addition to rais25. See RALPH H. FoLsOM, EUROPEAN UNION LAW INA NUTSHELL 42-43 (1995) (de-

scribing the legislative role of the European Parliament as limited).
26. See SHAW, supranote 13, at 25 (discussing the formation, duties, and limited powers of the European Parliament).
27. See TATCHELL, supra note 12, at 15 (noting that "with no real authority to initiate
legislation, [the European Parliament] has little more than a consultative and advisory role
in relation to the more powerful European Commission and Council of Ministers"). The
Parliament's recommendations are often ignored. See id.at 18. Yet, the Maastricht Treaty
provides the European Parliament the right to be consulted by the Council of Ministers and
the European Commission before either institution takes action in certain areas of the law.
See FOLSOM, supranote 25, at 43. For example, the European Parliament can prepare a report for the Commission or Council. See id Even though this report is non-binding, the
Council or Commission acts illegally if it acts without waiting for the report. See id The
European Parliament can use this as an effective tool to delay legislation it opposes. See id
28. Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1.
29. Maastricht Treaty, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1.
30. See EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 189(b)-(c) (providing cooperation and codecision powers to the European Parliament); see also FOLSOM, supra note 25, at 43-46
(describing in detail the new powers granted to the European Parliament). Since the Single
European Act, the Parliament has had the opportunity to provide amendments on legislation
proposed by the Commission and has worked with the Council of Ministers proposing
common positions, which the Council can adopt. See The Single European Act, 1987 OJ.
(L 169) 1; FOLsOM, supranote 25 at 43-44. In addition, the European Parliament can veto
certain legislation dealing with specific articles of the EC Treaty. See id at 45-46. Of interest to gays and lesbians is that the European Parliament can veto legislation dealing with
Article 48 of the EC Treaty (free movement of people). See id It is, however, the Council
of Ministers who makes decisions to pass legislative acts. See SHAw, supra note 13, at 5152.

31. See TATCHELL, supra note 12, at 15.
32. See FOLSOM, supra note 25, at 47 (describing the use of questions by MEPs); see,
e.g., EUR.PARL. DEB. (No. 432) 210 (June 9, 1993) (documenting that Mrs. Crawley, MEP,
asked about recognition of same-sex partnerships and related immigration issues); Written
question by Nel van Dijk and Claudia Roth to the Commission, 1996 OJ. (C 280) 117
(noting that Claudia Roth, MEP, inquired about a ban on marriages between two persons of
the same sex); see also Hein Verkerk, Questions in European Parliament on Dutch Gay
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ing questions about equal protection and recognition of same-sex couples, the Parliament has produced many pro-gay resolutions,33 reports,34 and recommendations. 5 Even so, the European Parliament does not have the power to enforce these

Marriage, in ILGA EUROLETrE 41, Apr. 1996 (visited Sept. 10, 1997) <http://fglb
qrd.org:8080/fqrd/assocs/ilga/euroletter/4 I.htmil# Question> [hereinafter ILGA EUROLETrEIt
41] (describing Nel van Dijk's and Claudia Roth's question, which asked if the European
Commission agreed with the Dutch Parliament's decision to lift the ban on gay marriages);
infra note 134 (describing MEP Glyn Ford's question calling for the European Commission
to acknowledge how discrimination of gays and lesbians creates obstacles for the European
Community to achieve its goals and objectives); Gay Friendly Question in the European

Parliament, in ILGA EUROLETrE 43, Aug. 1996 (visited Sept. 10, 1997) <http://fglb
.qrd.org:8080/fqrd/assocs/ilga/euroletter/43.html> [hereinafter ILGA EUROLETrER 43]
(quoting Swedish MEP, Joern Svensson's, question: "What has the Commission done since
[the adoption of a resolution calling for the end of discrimination against gays and lesbians]
to combat discrimination against homosexuals in society?"). But see, e.g., Anti Gay Question in the European Parliament, in ILGA EUROLEMrER 43, supra (describing the anti-gay

question, which, asked the European Commission to study the effects on society of the
"union of individuals who are not naturally compatible" and "characteristics of any children
who are adopted by or the result of such unions"). The Commissioner's answer to this antigay question was evasive and referred the Member of the European Parliament to a report
co-financed by the Commission-HooSEXuALryr: A EUROPEAN CoMMUNrry IssuE. See
id.
33. See, e.g., Hein Verkerk, Resolution in EuropeanParliamenton Romania, in ILGA
EUROLETrE 45, Nov. 1996 (visited Sept. 10, 1997) <http://fglb.qrd.org:8080/fqrd/assocs
/ilga/euroletter/45.html> [hereinafter ILGA EUROLETrER 45] (discussing the draft resolution
that the MEPs debated in the European Parliament condemning Romania's decision to introduce heavy penalties for consensual homosexual acts); European ParliamentRepeats Its
Commitment to Lesbian and Gay Rights, in ILGA EuROLETrER 45, supra (indicating that
on September 15, 1996 the European Parliament reaffirmed its continued work toward
ending discrimination of gays and lesbians in the European Community by adopting a
resolution calling for the end to such discrimination); see also Grant's Written Observations, supra note 6, at 26 (citation omitted) (noting that as early as 1984, the European Parliament adopted a resolution dealing with sexual discrimination in the workplace, including
under that topic a discussion on the problems of sexual orientation discrimination).
34. See TATCHELL, supra note 12, at 17-18 (discussing four pro-gay reports adopted by
the European Parliament: The D'Ancona Report on Violence Against Women (June 1986);
The Parodi Report on the Fight Against AIDS (May 1989); The Buron Report on the
Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (November 1989); and
The Ford Report on Racism and Xenophobia (October 1990)).
35. See Important Votes in the European Parliament,in ILGA EUROLETrER 30, supra
note 14 (discussing the Parliament's recommendations on gay and lesbian issues). The
European Parliament debated and voted on recommendations to the Council of Ministers
that considered whether "family policy should include the recognition of different households, including non-traditional and alternative families without any form of discrimination
...[and to] adapt family legislation to the changes that have occurred in the function and
structure of the modem family at the national as well as European level .... "Id. While the
vote on certain portions of this recommendation did not pass, eventually an amended compromise was passed by roughly a 3-to-I margin. See id.
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reports and recommendations and neither the European Commission" nor the
Council of Ministers normally act upon these recommendations."
Parliament's inability to provide gays and lesbians with their fundamental rights
indicates the importance of Grantand the European Court of Justice to the gay and
lesbian movement. Arguably, no European institution, other than the European
Court of Justice, has the willingness, the focus, and the political ability to protect
gay and lesbians in the workplace.
C. CouN cIL OF MINISTERS
The Council of Ministers is essentially the main legislative body of the Community.3 Unlike the United States Congress, however, the Council of Ministers is
not a body that initiates legislation.39 Instead, the European Commission decides
what legislative proposals the Council of Ministers considers: Thus, while this
Comment suggests that the Council is not very gay-friendly, all blame cannot rest
with the Council, as the organization of the European Community institutions limits each institution's powers to some extent.4' The Council of Ministers is the final
decision making institution.42 It is not, however, the institution that initiates the
process4 The Council of Ministers can only react to the European Commission's
proposals." Absent Commission proposals on the issue of gay and lesbian rights,
the Council is not in a position to take a stand. Yet, under Article 152 of the EC
36. See infra notes 56-66 and accompanying text (discussing the European Commission); see also TATCHELL, supra note 12, at 18-19 (describing the Commission's adamant
denial that it has responsibility for gay and lesbian issues). The Commission even argued
that "the EC Treaties restrict what it is legally empowered to do." Id "Since there is nothing
explicit in the EC Treaties about the rights of lesbians and gay men, the Commission insisted it has no legal competence to take action on matters of sexuality." Id; see also Clapham & Weiler, supra note 11, at 28 (noting the consistent argument by the Commission that
it cannot act on gay and lesbian issues).
37. See, e.g., TATCHELT, supra note 12, at 16-18 (noting that even though the Commission indicated that it would take action on the Squarcialupi Report, which called for the end
of discrimination of gays and lesbians, it never did); see also FOLSO., supranote 25, at 4445 (noting that, under the cooperation procedure, of the nearly 1,000 amendments the Parliament suggested, the Council of Ministers acted on less than half).
38. See SHAw, supranote 13, at 7 (describing the powers of the Council of Ministers).
But see, SHAw, supra note 13, at 51 (indicating that "It]he legislative function is presently
divided between the Council of Ministers and the Parliament, with inputs from the Commission and other subsidiary bodies."). "There is no single legislative or executive procedure which can be described in simple terms." d
39. Cf. SHtAw, supra note 13, at 7 (noting that the European Commission initiates legislation).
40. See P.S.R.F. MATHuSEN, A GUIME To EUROPEAN UNION LAw 57 (6th ed. 1995) (describing how the Council of Ministers acts on proposals from the European Commission).
41. See SAw, supra note 13, at7, 51-53.
42. See id
43. See id.
44. See id.

1072

AM U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

[12:6

Treaty, the Council can request that the Commission work on a proposal for the
Council.4"
Even though the Council cannot initiate legislation, the Council is the final decision-maker. Under the TEU, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament share decision-making authority with respect to certain areas of European
Community law.46 Even so, the Council of Ministers clearly maintains more political power than the Parliament.4 Furthermore, the Council has expanded its legislative powers to include influencing the initiation of policies and controlling the
implementation of those policies."
While the Council of Ministers has more power49 than the Parliament to institute change in the European Community, it is not likely to do so for gays and lesbians."0 The Council of Ministers has been very reluctant to act on the pro-gay recommendations and reports of the European Parliament."'
Even if the Council of Ministers will not openly help gays and lesbians achieve
equality, gays and lesbians may increase their chances for support from the Council of Ministers if gay and lesbian issues are framed as economic integration issues. 2 Economic integration is a major goal of the EC treaty. s Social issues in

45. See EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 152 (providing the Council of Ministers with the
power to request that the Commission work on proposals relating to the attainment of the
European Community goals).
46. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (describing the relationship between the
European Community institutions).
47. See, SHAW, supra note 13, at 52 (noting that the Council of Ministers "has largely
retained the core legislative power.... [While t]he European Parliament [is] unable to
overcome the dominance of the Council, it has gradually emerged as a more significant political actor.").
48. SHAW, supra note 13, at 52 (discussing the Council of Minister's usurpation of
power from other institutions within the Community's institutional framework).
49. See FOLSOM, supra note 25, at 51 (describing the role of the Council of Ministers in
the legislative process as "dominant"); see also TATCHELL, supra note 12, at 15 (noting that
the Council of Ministers is the "main policy-making and legislative institution of the EC"
with the ability to over-rule both the European Parliament and the European Commission).
50. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (describing the failure of the Council to
act on pro-gay initiatives from the European Parliament); see also TATCHELL, supra note
12, at 22-23 (noting that the Council of Ministers does not want to deal with employment
issues affecting gays and lesbians).
51. See id.
52. See infra notes 127-134 and accompanying text (discussing the focus on economic
integration as opposed to the relatively recent expansion of the European Community institutions' focus on social issues). Even with social issues receiving more attention from the
Council of Ministers, because of its poor gay record, the more a gay related issue can be
framed as an economic integration issue the more likely it is that any Community institution
will take action on it because the primary purpose of the Community is economic integration. See EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2.
53. See EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2. Article 2 of the EC Treaty sets out the goals of'
the European Community:
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member states were not - and are still not - the main emphasis of the EC Treaty,
unless they affect economic unity.' In 1987, however, the European Community
adopted the Single European Act which expanded the focus of the European
Community to include social issues. 5
Even with the European Community now focusing some of its energy on social
issues,56 the European Commission's and Council of Ministers's records on gay
and lesbian issues suggest that an argument for equal protection absent some connection to the European Community's economic goals, based solely on an "equality" argument, may continue to fall on deaf ears Although times are changing
and the Community recognizes the relationship between social issues and the economic goals of the European Community, it is unlikely that any significant action
regarding equality for gays and lesbians will come from the Council of Ministers. -3
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and progressively approximating the economic policies of member States, to promote throughout the Community a
harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase instability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations bt%,;ecn the
States belonging to it.
Id.; see also TATCHELL, supra note 12, at 16 (explaining that economic unity is the purpose
behind the creation of the European Community); JOSEPH E STEIm,

TEXTOOK ON EEC

LAW 3-5 (4th ed. 1994) (noting that the EC treaty was established to create an economic
community modeled after the European Coal and Steel Community but on a larger scale).
54. See STEImR supra note 53, at 7 (indicating that the primary concern of the EC
Treaty is economic in nature, but it did include social goals). Compare Council Directive
75/129, 1975 O.J. (L 48) 29 (approximating various national laws on redundancies) and

Council Directive 80/987, 1980 O.L (L 283) 23 (approximating various national laws regarding the protection of employees after business insolvency) with TATCHEMLL supra note
12, at 22-23 (noting that the Council of Ministers does not want to deal with employment
issues affecting gays and lesbians). "Currently, [the Council of Ministers] see[s] lesbian and
gay equality as too controversial. They also treat it as a low priority compared with the
completion of the Single European Market, plans for economic and monetary union, and
other preoccupying issues such as ... economic aid to the ex-Soviet republics." Id. The
Council of Ministers has failed to approximate the various national laws providing varying
recognition of same-sex partnerships, which have an impact on economic integration and
the free movement of people. The more people express the impact that gay and lesbian discrimination has on the economic integration goals of the European Community, the more
likely the institutions of the European Community will address the issues important to gays
and lesbians.
55. See STEInR, supranote 53, at 7 (noting that with the adoption of the Single European Act, the focus of the European Community began to include social issues).
56. See infra notes 127-134 and accompanying text (discussing the recent expansion of
European goals to include social issues).
57. See discussion supra Part lI.C & infra Part ILD (discussing the failure of both the
Commission and the Council in adopting measures that would protect gays and lesbians
from inequality).
58. Compare infranotes 127-134 and accompanying text (discussing the Community's
expansion into social rights) with supra notes 37-57 and accompanying text (discussing the
failure of the Commission and Council to actively promote and adopt measures that would
protect gays and lesbians).
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It appears that neither the European Parliament nor the Council of Ministers has
the right combination of willingness and power to provide protection for gays and
lesbians in the workplace. The European Commission is no different.
D. EUROPEAN CoMMIssION

The European Commission is, essentially, a high powered executive civil service.59 The Commission consists of seventeen commissioners, with at least one from
each member country.' The Commission is "responsible for proposing and [,to a
lesser extent,] implementing the decisions of the Council of Ministers."'" Simply
put, it alone drafts legislative proposals on which the Council may or may not
act.62 "Almost all the provisions of the [EC T]reaty which grant law-making power
to the Council of Ministers begin on proposals from the Commission .... ,,' Furthermore, the EC Treaty requires that the Commission work with the Council of
Ministers to correct situations that violate the EC Treaty's objectives of economic
integration, such as problems effecting the free movement of people.'
Like the Council of Ministers, the European Commission has a poor record on
gay and lesbian issues. 65 Even so, gays and lesbians have lobbied the Commission
with little success.' There is hope that with increasing effort, both the Council and
59. See TATcHELL, supra note 12, at 15 (providing a brief outline of the roles of each
European Community institution including the European Commission).
60. See SHAw, supra note 13, at 53 (discussing the organization of the Commission and
appointments of commissioners to the institution).
61. Id. But see SHAw, supra note 13, at 52 (discussing how the Council of Ministers
has asserted more control regarding initiation and implementation of policies "largely at the
expense of the Commission"). It cannot be forgotten, however, that implementation of most
Council of Minister's decisions is done by member states' administrative agencies. See id
at 7.
62. See FOLSOM, supra note 25, at 64.
63. SHAw, supra note 13, at 56.
64. See EC Treaty, supra note 9, arts. 49, 100, 100a & 101 (requiring action by both
the European Commission and the European Council of Ministers to resolve various problems or conflicts of law that have an effect on the establishment of the common market).
65. See TATCHELL, supra note 12, at 30 (describing the Commission's insistence that it
has no power to provide protection or legislation for gays and lesbians). But see Grant's
Written Observations, supra note 6, at 26 (noting that "the Commission's 1991 Recommendation on the dignity of women and men at work rightly stressed that discrimination on
grounds of sexual orientation undermines the dignity of those affected.").
66. See TATCHELL, supra note 12, at 15-34 (discussing the slow progress of the gay and
lesbian movement within the European Community). But see Nils Kock, Improvementsfor
EU Staff, in ILGA EUROLETrFR 44, Sept. 1996 (visited Sept. 10, 1997) <http://fglb.qrd.org:
8080/fqrd/assocs/ilga/euroletter/44.html> [hereinafter ILGA EUROLETrER 44] (describing
the European Commission's adoption of policies that provide same-sex spouses of Commission employees certain benefits). While this seems contrary to the Commission's failure
to act on pro-gay proposals and recommendations, even more contradictory is the fact that
the European Parliament recently decided not to extend similar benefits to same-sex
spouses of its employees. See EGALrrE, MEPs Withhold Equal Treatmentfor Gays and Les-
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the Commission will become more responsive to the needs and requests of the gay
and lesbian community, however, until then gays and lesbians should pursue additional alternatives to obtain protections in the workplace. The European Court of
Justice is an appropriate forum to provide relatively swift justice for gays and lesbians. Even so, gays and lesbians have often looked to other international courts
and organizations for similar relief.'
E. INTERNATIONAL TREATY ORGANIZATIONS

1. Council of Europe & European Convention on Human Rights
Other alternatives to which gays and lesbians can turn are the various intergovemmental organizations and treaty organizations throughout Europe." This is an
alternative to the European Community institutional framework.
The institutions and structures of the European Community and the European
Union [should] not be confused with those of the Council of Europe an intergovernmental body fostering cooperation between European states, and in particular
with its m[o]st significant Treaty-based emanation, the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 69
Although the Council of Europe is a separate and distinct entity from the European
Community institutions, the European Court of Justice considers and weighs decisions and recommendations from intergovernmental bodies, such as the Council of
Europe, in connection with its consideration of the EC Treaty.70 It is important to
note that this consideration is not natural, but is part of the unique teleological interpretation of the treaties by the European Court of Justice."'
bians, in ILGA EUROLE=rE 47 Feb. 1997 (visited Sept. 10, 1997) <http'J/fglb.qrd.
org:8080/fqrdlassocs/ilga/euroletter/47.hmtl> (stating that the European Parliament's Legal
Affairs Committee surprisingly rejected a report which would have extended equal treatment to gay and lesbian members of the EU's staff who have legal partnerships in their own
countries).
67. See discussion infra Part II.E.
68. See Peter Van Dijk, The Treatment of Homosexuals Under the ECHR, in
HoMosExuALr'=: A EUROPEAN CoMMsnwry IssuF, supra note 11, 184-185 (noting that
gays and lesbians often seekjustice from the European Court of Human Rights).
69. SHAw,supranote 13, at 7.
70. See Clapham & Weiller, supra note 11, at 24 (noting that the European Convention
of Human Rights constitutes a clear bench mark which "the European Court of Justice will
always accept as binding within the field of community law"); see also IMARK BREALEY &
MARK HOSKiNS, RENMDmEs iNEC LAW 19-20 (1994) (citing Case 222184, Johnson v. Chief
Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, 1986 E.C.R. 1651 and noting that "[a]lthough
the European Convention on Human Rights is not directly a part of Community law, the
Court of Justice has stated that 'the principles on which the Convention is based must be
taken into consideration in Community law."').
71. See generally Kenneth M. Lord, Bootstrappingan Environmental Policyfrom an
Economic Covenant: The Teleological Approach of the European Court of Justice, 28
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Gays and lesbians have successfully lobbied the Council of Europe, getting the
Council of Europe to pass recommendations calling for equal treatment of gays
and lesbians.72 While the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe passed
pro-gay recommendations, these have limited value because they are only recommendations to signatory countries, and the Council cannot enforce these on signatory countries. 3 Despite its inability to enforce the Parliamentary Recommendations, the Council of Europe has a more effective way of pursuing recognition of
human rights-the European Convention on Human Rights ("Convention").74 The
Convention established two bodies: the European Commission on Human Rights
and the European Court of Human Rights.75
The European Court of Human Rights has a mixed record on gay and lesbian
issues.76 The Court of Human Rights has held in three separate opinions that Great
Britain, Ireland, and Cyprus's decisions to criminalize consensual homosexual sex
violated the convention,' which prompted the British government to repeal its
law.7" Yet even though it has addressed the issue of gay rights, the Court of Human
Rights has not expanded protection for gays and lesbians beyond this right of priCORNELL INT'L L.J. 571

(1996).

72. See, e.g., Alexandra Duda, The Council of Europe and What It Can Do for Gay
Men and Lesbians, in ILGA NEwSLETrER 30, supra note 14, (describing the founding of the
ILGA in 1978 and its success in lobbying the Council of Europe). The ILGA works with
the Parliamentary Assembly, the legislative body of the Council of Europe, which has
passed recommendations calling for equal treatment of gays and lesbians. See id. For example, in 1981, the Parliamentary Assembly passed Recommendation 924 which called for: 1)
equal treatment in the workplace; 2) the destruction of records collected on homosexuals; 3)
the abolishment of legislation which criminalizes homosexuality; 4) and the ending of "all
compulsory medical action or research designed to alter sexual orientation of adults." Id.
73. See infra note 81 (suggesting that member countries are not bound to act on the
decisions handed down from the Council of Europe and European Court of Human Rights).
74. See TATCHELL, supra note 12, at 26 (describing how the Council of Europe uses the
Convention to protect human rights). The European Commission on Human Rights [hereinafter Commission] administers the Convention. See id. When individuals claim that a country violated their rights under the Convention, the Commission determines which of these
claims have merit and should proceed to the European Court of Human Rights. See id.
75. See id.
76. Compare Kurt Krickler, Written Presentationto the OSCE Review Conference, Vienna, November 1996, in ILGA EuROLETrR 45, supra note 33, (noting that "[o]n three occasions, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the prohibition of homosexuality
among consenting adults to be a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights")
with infra note 79 (listing four cases in which the Court of Human Rights decided against
the gay or lesbian party).
77. See, e.g., Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, App. No. 45, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149 (1981);
Norris v. Ireland, App. No. 142, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 186 (1988); Modinos v. Cyprus, App.
No. 15070/89, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 485 (1989).
78. See Lawrence R. Heifer, Findinga Consensus on Equality: The Homosexual Age of
Consent and the European Convention on Human Rights, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1044, 1045,
1059-61 (1990) (noting that after Dudgeon Britain repealed its law that criminalized homosexual acts between consenting adults).
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vacy of sexual activity.79 For example, the Court of Human Rights failed to find
that deportation of one member of a same-sex partnership violated the Convention."0 This suggests that if Grant were before the Court of Human Rights, that
Court probably would not stop the discrimination against Lisa Grant. In addition,
because the Court of Human Rights is an intergovernmental organization (as opposed to a super-governmental organization like the European Community), it
lacks the authority to effectively enforce its decisions without offending signatory
countries."1
Even with the possibility of limited enforcement powers of the Court of Human
Rights, the European Court of Justice considers the general principles embodied in
the European Convention on Human Rights part of Community law and often
79. See, e.g., X and Y v. United Kingdom, 32 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 220,
221 (1983) (holding that a Malaysian gay partner of a British gay man was not protected
from deportation under Article 8 of the Convention, an article which requires respect for
family life); X v. United Kingdom, II Eur. H.R. Rep. 49, 50 (1989) (deporting a lesbian
partner in a same-sex couple did not violate Article 8(1) of the Convention); B v. United
Kingdom, 34 Eur. Comm'n I-I.R. Dec. & Rep. 68 (1983) (upholding the right of the military
to discriminate against gays); S v. United Kingdom, 47 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
274 (1986) (upholding discrimination of gays in housing).
80. See X v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 50 (deporting a lesbian partner in a
same-sex couple); see also Van Dijk, supra note 68, at 184-85 (suggesting that the European Court of Human Rights does not take a pro-gay and lesbian stance).
81. See Lawless v. Ireland, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 408 (1960-61) (noting the fine
line that the European Court of Human Rights walks in enforcing the Convention and
showing deference to the national governments).
The concept of the margin of appreciation is that a government's discharge of [its] responsibilities
is essentially a delicate problem of appreciating complex factors and of balancing conflicting considerations of the public interest; and that, once the Commission or the Court is satisfied that the
Government's appreciation is at least on the margin of rits] powers... then the interest %%hichthe
public itself has in effective government and in the maintenance of order justifies and requires a
decision infavor of the legality ofthe Government's appreciations.
d; see also, e.g., TATCHEIT, supra note 12, at 26 (noting that even if the Court of Human
Rights decides a case against a member country, that country is not necessarily obligated to
comply with the Court of Human Rights's order); Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) at 15 (1978); James v. United Kingdom, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 44 (1986)
(conceding that "[c]ontracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing
whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations permit a different
treatment in law"); Malone v. Commissioner of Police, 2 All E.R. 620, 647 (Ch. 1979)
(noting that the Convention has no direct effect on British law); ARTmuM HMYa
ROBERTSON & JoHN GRAHA MEmaws, HUMN RIGHTS INTHE WVORLD 230 (1989) (noting
the difficulty intergovernmental organizations face in enforcing their decisions on signatory
countries). Compare Clapham & Weiler, supra note 11, at 39-40 and Patrick DillonMalone, Individual Remedies and the StrasbourgSystem in an Irish Context, in HUMAN
RIGHTS: A EuRoPEAN PRoSPECrvE 48 (Liz Heffernan ed., 1994) (noting that the Convention is not incorporated into the Irish law, and thus the Irish courts have not applied it to
cases) with TATCHaL, supra note 12, at 25 (noting that the Irish government eventually
changed its law, that made consensual adult homosexual sex illegal, after the European
Court of Human Rights handed down its decision).
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looks to decisions by the Court of Human Rights in reaching its own decisions.8 2
Lisa Grant correctly relies on certain Court of Human Rights decisions in her
Written Observations to the European Court of Justice.83 The restrictive and conservative nature of the Court of Human Rights, a Court established under an international, not super-national treaty, combined with its unwillingness to protect gays
and lesbians in areas other than private consensual sex, suggests that Lisa Grant's
suit might fail if before the European Court of Human Rights." While gays and
lesbians may find certain decisions from the European Court of Human Rights
helpful in making their arguments before the European Court of Justice, reliance
on additional treaties or covenants may further increase the strength of their arguments before the European Court of Justice.
2. Other Treaties and Covenants
In addition to relying on the Convention and the Court of Human Rights, there
are other treaties that are useful to Lisa Grant's case and the gay and lesbian civil
rights movement in Europe. In an argument for same-sex marriage, for example,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") is helpful because it considers marriage, albeit not specifically same-sex marriage, a fundamental right.85 While the ICCPR outlaws discrimination based on sex,86 neither the
82. See supra note 70 (describing the deference the European Court of Justice has for
the Convention and the European Court of Human Rights); see also Case C-13/94, P v. S
and Comwall County Council, 1996 E.C.R. 1-2145, 2 C.M.L.R. 247 (1996) (AdvocateGeneral's opinion) (relying on various decisions by the European Court of Human Rights).
83. See Grant's Written Observations, supra note 6, at 14 n.1 (citing the European
Court of Human Rights's decisions in Dudegon and Norris).
84. See supra note 79 (citing the cases involving deportation of gays and lesbians in
which the Court of Human Rights failed to interpret the Convention to protect them); see
also Van Dijk, supra note 68, at 185 (suggesting that bringing a case before the European
Court of Human Rights might not be worthwhile for gays and lesbians). "Is it mainly a
waste of energy, time and money-apart from an interesting experience and possibly a visit
to the pleasant city of Strasbourg.. . ." Id.

85. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, openedfor signatureDec.
16, 1966, S. TREATY Doc. No. 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (entered into
force Mar. 23, 1976); see also Jorge Martin, Note, English Polygamy Law and the Danish

Registered PartnershipAct: A Casefor the Consistent Treatment of Foreign Polygamous
Marriagesand Danish Same-Sex Marriagesin England, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 419, 43435 (1996) (noting that marriage is a fundamental right in most European countries, including Denmark and England, both signatory countries to ICCPR). For an in-depth discussion
of the ICCPR and gay marriages, see generally Anne M. Burton, Gay Marriage-A Modern
Proposal:Applying Baehr v. Lewin to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STuD. 177 (1995).

86. See ICCPR, supra note 85, arts. 2(l), 26 (noting that the fundamental right of
equality is available to all people). Article 2(l) states that "[a]ll persons are equal before the
law and are entitled without discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination based on any ground such as race, colour, sex .... "
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ICCPR nor the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
("ICESCR")8 7 specifically provide equal rights to gays and lesbians. Lisa Grant,
however, cites a decision by the Human Rights Committee, which the ICCPR established,"8 that has interpreted the ICCPR's sex discrimination language to include protections for discrimination based on sexual orientation." This decision,
Toonen v. Australia, coupled with the various covenants' broad protective lan-

guage on human rights, suggest that these treaties are important safeguards of human rights on which gays and lesbians can rely for protection.' While the European Court of Justice may find the reasoning of the Toonen case helpful in
reaching its decision, unlike prior European Court of Justice decisions and relevant
Court of Human Rights decisions, Human Rights Committee decisions carry no
precedential value before the European Court of Justice.
Although gays and lesbians have rightly looked to intergovernmental organizations for protection," the legal value of these treaties and decisions are questionable and not binding as precedent on the European Court of Justice, as are European Community legislation or prior decisions from the Court of Justice itself.'
While these decisions are influential and useful when arguing before the European
Court of Justice,93 relying solely on decisions from the Court of Human Rights or
Grant's Written Observations, supra note 6, at II(citing ICCPR, supra note 85, arts. 2(l),

26).
87. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 7(a)(l)
openedfor signature Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY Doc. No. 95-2, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
ICESCR] (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) (including protection against sex discrimination
in the workplace). ICESCR focuses on "[f]air wages and equal remuneration of any kind, in
particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men
with equal pay for equal work." Id
88. See ICCPR, supranote 85, art. 1; see also Brenda Sue Thornton, The New International Jurisprudenceon the Right to Privacy: A Head-on Collision with Bowers v. Hardwick, 58 ALB. L. REv. 725, 733-36 (1995) (describing the United Nations and the creation
of the Human Rights Committee).
89. See Toonen v. Australia, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. No. 488, U.N. Doe. CCPR/c/
50/D0488/1992 (1994); see infra notes 273-275 and accompanying text (describing the
Toonen decision).
90. See Grant's Written Observations, supra note 6, at 10-14 (citing several Court of
Human Rights decisions as well as the Human Rights Committee's decision in Toonen).
Unfortunately the only pro-gay cases from the Court of Human Rights focus on the privacy
rights of gays and lesbians to engage in consensual homosexual sex, thus it is unlikely that
cases such as Dudegon will significantly influence the European Court of Justice's decision
in the Grant case. See also supra note 79.
91. See, e.g., supra note 77 and accompanying text (listing cases in which gays and
lesbians looked the European Court of Human Rights to deal with signatory country laws
that made consensual adult homosexual activity illegal).
92. See DAVID O'KEEFFE & PATRICK M. TOMiEY, LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MMASTRICHT
TRaaY 125-26 (1994) (noting that the Convention is not formally binding on the European
Community). But see supraPart II.E.I (discussing the European Court of Justice's recognition and application of the Convention and Court of Human Rights decisions).
93. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (noting the European Court of Justice's
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the United Nation's Human Rights Committee for the advancement of gay and
lesbian issues before the European Court of Justice is unwise.
3. Other European Union Treaties
After the Treaty of Rome, the Community signed various instruments dealing
with social issues, including the Social Policy Protocol and the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers of 1989."' These instruments are not
as influential as the EC Treaty, but have more persuasive authority than the ICCPR
or the European Convention on Human Rights." The fact that they are not binding
international agreements but have legally binding force of lesser value limits their

effectiveness.'
All of these institutions, intergovernmental organization and treaties, while important to the gay and lesbian movement, none are more useful than the European
Court of Justice to provide gays and lesbians with equal treatment in the workplace
and at the least some discussion of same-sex partnerships. Furthermore, the European Court of Justice, while considering the Grantcase, can fulfill its obligation to
ensure attainment of the European Community goals, by finding in favor of Lisa
Grant.

III. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
The European Court of Justice offers a unique forum for gays and lesbians
working for equality. The European Court of Justice interprets the EC Treaty as a
constitution, from which individuals derive certain rights.9 7 Grant, therefore, is a
consideration of the European Court of Human Rights' decisions).
94. See Carlos A. Ball, The Making of a TransnationalCapitalistSociety: The Court of
Justice, Social Policy, and Individual Rights Under the European Community's Legal Order, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 307, 313 (1996) (discussing the Social Policy Protocol and other

agreements affecting social issues in the European Community).
95. See Clapham & Weiler, supra note 11, at 39-40 (noting that these agreements have
an "uncertain and inconclusive place within the Community's constitutional framework").
Arguably, the amendments to the EC Treaty, including the Social Policy Protocol and
Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers of 1989 probably have a
stronger influence on the Court of Justice than the ICCPR or the Convention because they
are European Union agreements. See id.
96. See id.; see also Evert van der Veen & Astrid Mattijssen, Lesbian and Gay Rights
in Europe: Homosexuality and the Law, in THE THIRD PINK BOOK: A GLOBAL VIEW OF
LESBIAN AND GAY LIBERATION AND OPPRESSION 22546 (Aart Hendriks et al. eds., 1993)
(noting that in the Netherlands the national courts cannot declare a national law unconstitutional, but they can declare it void if it contradicts an international treaty such as the Convention or ICCPR).
97. See Case 294/83 Parti Ecologiste "les Verts" v. Parliament 1986 E.C.R. 1339, 1365
(referring to the treaties as the Community's "constitutional charter"); see also Ball, supra
note 94, at 307 (noting that "the European Court of Justice... has interpreted the [EC
Treaty] as a constitution, forming the foundation of an international legal order that imposes
substantive obligations on the Member States and confers corresponding rights on individu-
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perfectly situated case to require equal pay to gay or lesbian employees, specifically gay or lesbian partners in a same-sex partnership. In addition, while a progay decision by the Court of Justice in this case would not provide instant recognition of same-sex unions in all areas of the law, it could start a dialogue as well as
lay a foundation to help establish eventual legal recognition of same-sex partnerships.
A. ORGANIZATION OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE

The European Court of Justice is a body of fifteen judges. 3 Although not appointed for life," these judges and their decisions are expected to be free from political and social pressures.' 00 Among other reasons, due to this independence from
politics or because of the integrity and impartiality of the judicial system, the
European Court of Justice has found that European Community law protects
groups of people that the member states and the other European Community institutions have often ignored."' The European Court of Justice is the European
Community institution that is most likely to produce enforceable pro-gay results,
more so than the European Parliament, the European Commission, or the Council
of Ministers. For example, the Court of Justice in P v. S and Cornwvall County
Council, a case similar to Grant, found that Council directive 76207, which prohibited sex discrimination, protected transgenderedce persons from discriminaals arising from those obligations.").
98. See FoLsOM, supra note 25, at 70, 120-21 (describing the organization of the European Court of Justice and how judges are appointed to the Court).
99. See id (noting that judges on the European Court of Justice serve six year terms but
can be reappointed).
100. See EC Treaty, supranote 9, art. 167 (requiring judges to be "chosen from persons
whose independence is beyond doubt"). But cf EC Treaty, supranote 9, art. 156 (indicating
that Article 156 holds members of the European Commission to the same integrity and independence standard).
101. See, e.g., Case C-13/94, P v. S and Cornwall County Council, 1996 E.C.R. 1-216065 (protecting transgendered persons from discrimination). Perhaps it is unfair to say that
the other institutions generally ignore minorities, specifically sexual minorities, when the
framework of the institutions does not allow each institution an equal opportunity to freely
and independently provide protections. See SHAW, supranote 13, at 51 (describing the limits, overlap, and uniqueness of the European Community institutions). At least one gay activist believes that protecting sexual minorities has not been the focus of the European
Community institutions. See TATCHELL, supranote 12, at 22-23 (indicating that in addition
to the focus on economic integration, the European Community focuses its energies on issues that are at best tangentially related to economic integration, such as financial assistance
to the former Soviet Union). Until relatively recently, however, the European Community's
focus has been on economics and integration. See discussion supra note 55 and accompanying text (describing the Single European Act's expansion of the Community institutions'
focus to include social issues).
102. See Henri Delvaux, Legal Consequences ofSex Reassignment in ComparativeLaw,
in TRANSSEXUAUSM, MEDICINE AND LAW, COUNCIL OF EUROPE 149 (Council of Europe ed.

1993) (defining transsexualism as "a syndrome characterized by a dual personality, one
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tion.' 3
The willingness of the Court of Justice to address difficult issues, such as
equality of transgendered persons as it did in P, is one more reason the Court is a
viable avenue for gays and lesbians. But, exactly how does such a case get to the
European Court of Justice?
1. Article 177
Article 177'0' of the EC Treaty "permits the national courts of the Member
States to request a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice when, inter alia,
matters relating to the interpretation of Community law are raised before them,
usually by individual litigants."'0 5 Many Article 177 cases derive from actions by
individuals brought before the national courts."° Then, when and if a question
arises about the interpretation or application of the Community law, the highest
national court must refer the case to the European Court of Justice, while the lower
national courts have complete discretion.0 7
For example, in Lisa Grant's case, the Southampton Industrial Tribunal asked
the European Court of Justice to answer six questions as to whether unequal treatphysical, the other psychological, together with such a profound conviction of belonging to
the other sex that the transsexual person is prompted to ask for the corresponding bodily
'correction' to be made.").
103. See P, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-2165 (interpreting "sex discrimination" broadly to protect
sexual minorities from discrimination).
104. EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 177. Article 177 of the EC Treaty states:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning:
(a)the interpretation of this Treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community;
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the Council, where those
statutes so provide.... Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a member
State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to give
judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon.
Id

105. Ball, supra note 94, at 325-26 (discussing the use of Article 177 actions brought to
the European Court of Justice); see SHAW supra note 13, at 15 (discussing the importance
of Article 177 and noting that "[tihe key to the structure of indirect enforcement lies in the
organic connection between the Court of Justice and the national courts in Article 177...
."); STEINER,

supra note 53, at 319 (noting that fifty percent of all cases heard before the

European Court of Justice are Article 177 proceedings).
106. See SHAW, supra note 13, at 15.
107. See EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 177; see also STENER, supra note 53, at 325-26

(noting that any member country's national courts or tribunals can and, in some cases, must
refer cases to the European Court of Justice pursuant to Article 177 of the EC Treaty). The
highest level national courts must bring a case under Article 177(3) to the European Court
of Justice if it involves interpretation of EC law and if there is no judicial remedy under national law. See id. at 326. This is referred to as mandatory jurisdiction, whereas permissive
jurisdiction provides the national courts unfettered discretion to refer cases to the European
Court of Justice. See id. at 328.
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ment of gays and lesbians is a violation of Article 119 of the EC Treaty.3 Once
the European Court of Justice answers these questions it will return the case to the
Southampton Tribunal to decide the case consistent with the European Court of
Justice's answers."°
Even though Article 177 decisions are narrowly tailored," the decisions often
has an impact on the member states, pursuant to Article 5 of the EC Treaty."' For
example, the European Court of Justice's decision in Defrenne v. Sabena, a landmark equal pay case brought to the Court under Article 177, had implications on
all member states." 2 Therefore, a decision by the European Court of Justice in
Grant will have an impact throughout the European Community on the treatment
of gays, lesbians, and same-sex partnerships in the workplace. If the Court answers
the submitted questions in favor of Lisa Grant, it would conclude that the unequal
treatment of same-sex partnerships in the workplace is a violation of Article 119.
The European Court of Justice's decision in an Article 177 case will prevail
over conflicting member countries' laws.'" Under the doctrine of supremacy,
when the national law conflicts with the EC law, the EC law prevails.""
2. Supremacy
Even though there is no supremacy clause in the EC Treaty, the European Court
of Justice concluded that when European lav and national laws conflict, European
108. See Grant's Written Observations, supra note 6, at 3; see also infra note 223 and

accompanying text (quoting the six questions before the European Court of Justice in Lisa
Grant's case).

109. See SHAW, supra note 13, at 16 (noting the Court of Justice's ability to frame its
decisions in a way that requires the national court to apply Community law). "T]he Court

of Justice does not have the power in the context of a[n Article 177] hearing to invalidate a
provision of national law

...
But the manner

in which the Court of Justice has often chosen

to frame its rulings has given little choice to the referring court but to apply Community law
in preference to national law, and in effect to invalidate provisions of national law." Id
110. See STEMIn, supra note 53, at 336 (noting that in an Article 177 proceeding the
European Court of Justice's decision is binding on the individual case).
111. See EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 5. Article 5 of the EC Treaty requires member
states to "take all appropriate measures ...to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising
out of this treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community." Id
Furthermore, in Great Britain, the United Kingdom's European Communities Act of 1972
requires the United Kingdom to take "judicial notice of any decision of the European
Court[;] it should also be applied in all subsequent cases." STEINRa, supra note 53, at 244.
112. See Case 43/75 Defrenne v. Sabena, 1976 E.C.R. 455 (holding that Article 119 applied to the government, unions, and private contracts); see also DIRECTORATE-GEEmRAL
FOR EMPLOYmENT, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND SOcIAL AFFAIRS, EUROPEAN CoLMISSION,

HANDBOOK ON EQUAL TREATENENT FOR MEN AND WO,,mN IN THE EuROPEAN Co:.uNnY 11

(1995) (summarizing the Court's decision in Sabena and other landmark cases).
113. See SHAW,supra note 13, at 146-47 (describing the authority and effects of European Court of Justice decisions).
114. See discussion infra Part HI.A.2 (describing in detail the doctrine of supremacy).
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law trumps the national law." 5 The Court can find a member country's law to be
inconsistent with Community law, a conclusion which requires national agencies
and courts to no longer apply their domestic law.' 6 The Court's ability to bind all
member countries, regardless of the individual national laws that vary in their
treatment of gays and lesbians, is just one aspect of the Court's power, making it
an immensely important Community institution for the gay and lesbian movement.
In Grant, the Court could hold that Article 119 requires all employees to provide gays and lesbians with equal pay, including travel benefits for their partners.
This would make discriminatory treatment of gays and lesbians in the workplace
illegal in all member countries." 7 In order to enforce this decision against member
countries that fail to enforce the decision on their own, the EC Treaty allows individuals to bring claims against their member country for the country's failure to
comply with the ruling under the doctrine of direct effect."'

3. Direct Effect
The European Court of Justice's power over member states grew with the
adoption of supremacy of European law and the notion of direct effect. The doctrine of direct effect allows individuals to raise Community law issues in their national tribunals." 9 The doctrine allows individuals to bring an action in court to
enforce his or her rights even though the member state has failed to make the re-

spective Community law effective. 2 ' Therefore, by allowing individuals to bring a
claim based on European Community law the European Court of Justice, through
the doctrine of direct effect, allows gays and lesbians to have their rights enforced,
even absent actions by the Parliament, the Council, the Commission, or any inter-

115. See Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585 (adopting the supremacy doctrine). "[The transfer by the states from their domestic legal system of the rights and obligations under the [EC] Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign
rights, against which a subsequent unilateral act incompatible with the concept of the
Community cannot prevail." Id.; see also Case 26/62, Van Gend en Los v. Nederlandse
Administratie der Belastingen, 1986 E.C.R. 1, 12; Case 106/77, Amministrazione Delle Finanze v. Simmenthal, 1978 E.C.R. 629.
116. See Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585 (showing the supremacy of European Community law).
117. Although this Comment does not discuss it, a pro-gay decision in Grant would
likely have a substantial impact on gays in the military.
118. See discussion, infra Part III.A.3.
119. See FOLSOM, supra note 25, at 86 (describing the concept of direct effect).
The right to commence litigation innational forums must be given to the plaintiff by national law.
In other words, European Union law has not (as yet) been interpreted to create national causes of
action. What it does do, according to the 'direct effects doctrine,' is give litigants the right to raise
many EU law issues.., innational courts and tribunals.
Id.
120. See FOLSOM, supra note 25, at 86 (noting that the individual citizen, like the Commission, functions as a guardian of the EC Treaty, by raising a complaint against the member country).
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governmental organization. If the European Court of Justice finds in favor of Lisa
Grant, then gays and lesbians throughout the European Community could enforce
this right of equal treatment by bringing claims based on European Community
law in their national courts.
B. SUMMARY- THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE'S ROLE IN PROTECTING GAYS
AND LESBIANS

The European Court of Justice has the power to help gay and lesbian causes in
an absence of willingness or political ability on the part of the other Community
institutions to use their power in this respect. Clearly, both the Commission and
Council of Ministers are powerful legislative bodies. They are, however, preoccupied with other issues and constrained from acting independently of one another."'
Therefore, many individuals have turned to the European Court of Justice to pro-

tect their rights under the EC treaty and in Lisa Grant's case to determine the exact
nature of gay and lesbian rights in the workplace.' " Because of the understandable
focus of the Commission and Council on economic issues, the European Court of
Justice represents the most appropriate institution from which gays and lesbians
can achieve equality, including protections for gays and lesbians in the workplace."2
In addition to those arguments previously discussed there are additional arguments that support a finding for Lisa Grant. For example, the Court should consider the growing trend of member countries that legally recognize same-sex partnerships and that provide protections for gays and lesbians in the workplace. u4
Another compelling argument is that the failure to recognize same-sex partnerships and to discriminate against gays and lesbians throughout the European
Community impedes the progress of European integration and the achievement of
the goals of the European Community."

121. See SHAw, supra note 13, at 7, 51 (indicating the intertwined relationship between
the European Community institutions); see also supra note 54 (describing the European
Community's focus on economic issues). There is no doubt that the European Community's
main focus is on economic related issues. It is obvious, however, that discrimination of gays
and lesbians is as much an economic issue as it is a social issue.
122. See Ball, supra note 94, at 348 n.187 (discussing the actions brought by individual
citizens before the European Court of Justice seeking protection under the EC Treaty); see
also FoLsOM, supra note 25, at 86 (noting that the individual citizen acts like the Commission by raising a complaint against the member country).
123. See ROBERT WVINTEMUIfl SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 2 (1995)
(noting that "marching on legislatures with banners and loudspeakers, or lobbying elected
and appointed government officials behind the scenes, is not the only option").
124. See discussion infra Part V (providing analysis of the various laws providing legal
rights to same-sex partnerships in certain member countries).
125. See discussion infra Part IV (describing the goal of economic integration and how
the unequal treatment of gays and lesbians limits the attainment of these goals).
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IV. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
Having concluded that the European Court of Justice is probably the European
Community institution from which gays and lesbians most likely can obtain certain
protections, and considering that Grant is currently before the Court, this Comment reviews arguments that support Lisa Grant's claims. This part of the Comment discusses the goals and objectives of the European Community and how
unequal treatment of and discrimination against gays and lesbians prevents the
European Community from achieving those goals. This is important to the European Court of Justice because one of the Court's responsibilities is to ensure the
achievement of these goals.'26
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND-GOALS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
The EC Treaty created the European Economic Community and focused

mainly on economic integration issues.'27 While this focus has broadened, with the
adoption of the Single European Act,'

the European Community remains preoc-

cupied with economic integration. 29 The preamble to the Single European Act indicates a focus on social justice and fundamental rights. 3 Since the adoption of
126. See SHAW, supra note 13, at 3 (1993) (noting that "[t]he European Court of Justice
never loses sight of the aim of integration when it is interpreting Community law.").
127. See FOLSOM, supra note 25, at 8-10 (describing the creation of the EC Treaty and
its focus on economic issues, such as trade, tariffs, and common policies on agriculture and
transportation); see also RuTH NIELSEN & ERPKA SzyszczAK, THE SociAL DIMENSION OF
THE EUROPEAN CoMMuNrry 19 (1991) (noting that the lack of social policy considerations
in the EC Treaty resulted from a belief that social policy considerations would not be an
issue because of the advancements in the quality of life resulting from creation of the community); Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon v. Metro, 1971 E.C.R. 487, 500 (noting that
"[t]he essential purpose of the [EC] Treaty ... is to unite national markets into a single
market.").
128. See Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1. Since the Single European Act was
passed in 1987, the European Community has expanded its focus on social issues. See
TATCHELL, supra note 12, at 16. "The EC was originally set up as an economic community
and is still primarily concerned with economic matters. However, since the passage of the
Single European Act, it has begun to take on a slightly broader social agenda." Id.
129. See TATCHELL, supra note 12, at 45 (noting that the focus of European integration
is economic, with an emphasis on "harmonizing product standards, technical and financial
regulations, business laws and occupational qualifications").
130. Single European Act, supra note 128, preamble. The preamble describes a more
social conscious Community that is "[d]etermined to work together to promote democracy
on the basis of the fundamental rights.., notably freedom, equality and social justice....
Aware of the responsibility incumbent on Europe... to display the principles of democracy
and compliance with the law and with human rights to which they are attached." Id.; see
also ELtES STEYGER, EUROPE AND rrs MEMBERS: A CONSITUIONAL APPROACH 47 (1995)

(citing Case 29/69 Stauder v. Stadt Ulm Sozialamt, 1969 E.C.R. 419 and noting that the
European Court of Justice recognized that the Treaty did not include protection of fundamental human rights, but held that these protections are found in the general principles of
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the Single European Act, the European Community has continued its expansion
into social issues, specifically through the signing of the TEU.131 Yet, even as the
Community's focus expands to include social issues, its main focus remains economic unity.'32 The European Community, however, should not forget that social
issues, such as recognition of same-sex partnerships and equal treatment of gays
and lesbians in the workplace, do impact the goals of economic integration' and
the free movement of people."
Community law). Perhaps, as this seems to suggest, these rights have been present from the
moment the member states signed the EC Treaty.
131. See FoLsoM, supra note 25, at 29 (discussing the impact of the TEU). The TEU
greatly expanded the Union's focus to include social issues. See i& at 29-30. The TEU went
so far as to include a "formal commitment to respect the rights protected by the European
Human Rights Convention," and adopted a Social Protocol, of which Great Britain has
opted out. See id at 30. But see Ball, supranote 94, at 331 (observing the confusion around
the TEU and the Social Policy Protocol).
The result was that the Community's social policy commitment was once again relegated to an
ineffectual (and confusing) compromise in which all (the then) twelve Member states assigned a
Social Policy Protocol to the TEU in which they agreed that eleven of the Member States (excluding the United Kingdom) shall 'have recourse to the institutions, procedures, and mechanisms
of the [Community] Treaty for the purposes' of implementing a Social Policy Agreement (attached to the Social Policy Protocol) agreed to by all the Member States' except for the United
Kingdom.
kd Making matters worse, some scholars argue that this is nothing more than an intergovernmental agreement, while others consider it a crucial element of EC law, raising
questions as to the legal value of the agreement See id
132. See FOLSOM, supra note 25, at 29 (noting that "[t]he most important Maastricht
amendments to the Treaty of Rome [EC Treaty] concern... economic and monetary integration, notably a detailed timetable for the convergence of national economies and creation
of a common currency."); see also Ball, supra note 94, at 331 (describing the European
Community's social policy in relation to its economic integration agenda); Philippa %Vatson, Social PolicyAfter Maastricht,30 CONION MKicr. L. REv., 480, 486-87 (1993) (arguing that the European Community's stance on social policy has not been inspiring--simply
declarations, pledges, and promises but no true action); TATcHELL, supra note 12, at 22-23
(indicating that the European government remains focused on economic issues).
133. See Ball, supra note 94, at 328 n.104 (suggesting that reaching these goals would
require some focus on social issues). In 1986, Jacques Delors, then the President of the
European Commission, noted that "[t]he creation of a vast economic area, based on the
market and business cooperation, is inconceivable-I would say-unattainable--without
some harmonization of social legislation." Id; see also id at 309 (referring to NIELSEN &
SzYSZCZAK, supra note 127 and indicating that "[elconomic integration, however, has not
occurred in a political or social vacuum, and it is generally agreed that the Community has
developed a social policy component that arises from, and is consistent with, its broader
economic objectives.").
134. See NIcHOLAS GREEN ET AL., THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF ThE SINGLE EUROPEAN
MARKET 92 (1991) (discussing the need for free movement of goods, people, workers, and
capital). The issue of free movement of gays and lesbians has been raised on several occasions. See TATCHELL supra note 12, at 18, 21 (indicating that Members of the European
Parliament have raised the concern that discrimination of gays and lesbians makes achievement of the European Community goals more difficult). In May of 1990 Glyn Ford, MEP
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B. FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE
There are certain articles in the EC Treaty that allow for the free movement of
people and for the elimination of obstacles to this goal.' Specifically, Articles 3,
48, 100, 100a and 101 require the Council of Ministers and the European Commission to ensure that the goal of free movement of people is achieved.' 36 This goal is
so fundamental to the success of integration that the European Commission created
a high level taskforce to deal with aspects and problems associated with the goal of

called:
on the Commission to acknowledge that discrimination against lesbians and gay men was a 'disincentive and an obstacle' to the achievement of three key objectives of the EC [set out in articles
48, 49, 100, 100a and 101 of the EC treaty]: the free movement of people, the creation of a barrier-free internal market, and the harmonization of the laws of the member states.
Id. at 21. Jacques Delors acknowledged that this discrimination was a barrier to certain
goals, especially the free movement of people. See id. at 18.
135. See EC Treaty, supra note 9, arts. 3, 48, 100, 100a, 101 (requiring action by various European Community institutions to ensure achievement of the Community goals); see
also TATcHELL, supra note 12, at 55 (discussing the articles in the EC Treaty that focus on
the issue of freedom of movement). See generallyBREALEY & HosKINs, supra note 70 (describing the EC Treaty articles that provide for the free movement of people).
136. See TATCHELL, supra note 12, at 55 (briefly discussing and listing the EC Treaty
articles); see also Martin, supra note 85, at 438 n.131 (noting that article 48 of the EC
Treaty allows a European Community citizen to enter another European Community member country to look for work or to start work in that country). The relevant articles of the
Treaty are:
Article 3:(c)... the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to freedom of movement
for persons ... (f) the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the common market Is
not distorted ....
Article 48: 1. Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Community by the
end ofthe transitional period at the latest....
Article 49: As soon as this Treaty comes into force, the Council shall, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission... issue directives or make regulations setting out the
measures required to bring about, by progressive stages freedom of movement for workers....
Article 100: The Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, issue directives for the approximation of such provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative
action in Member States that directly affect the establishment or functioning of the common market....
Article 100a: 1. By way of derogation from Article 100 ... The Council shall, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission in co-operation with the European Parliament
and after consulting the Economic Social Committee, adopt the measures for the approximation
of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which
have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market....
Article 101: Where the Commission finds that a difference between the provisions laid down by
law, regulation or administrative action in Member States is distorting the conditions of competition in the common market and that the resultant distortion needs to be eliminated, it shall consult
the Member States concerned.... If such consultation does not result in an agreement eliminating
the distortion in question, the Council shall, on a proposal from the Commission ... Issue the
necessary directives. The Commission and the Council may take any other appropriate measures
provided for in the Treaty....
EC Treaty, supra note 9, arts. 3, 48,49, 100, 100a, & 101.
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free movement of people.' The issue of recognition of same-sex partnerships in
member countries is an issue that this organization will be forced to
the different
138
address.

The goal of free movement between member countries has been achieved to a
large extent, but gaps remain. One such gap is the inconsistent treatment of gays
and lesbians in the European Community."' Gays and lesbians are protected in
some European Community member countries, but not in others. " For example, a
41
lesbian couple living in Denmark, where their partnership is legally recognized'
with corresponding legal benefits, is unlikely to move to Great Britain where the
government would not recognize their union. 42 If they did go to London together,
the British government would most likely not treat them as spouses under Council
Directive 1612/68, art. 10-12(a).'43 As such, a non-working partner in a same-sex
137. See Steffen Jensen, Free Movement ofPeople Within the EU - New Group Estab40, Apr. 1996 (visited Sept. 10, 1997) <http'J/fglb.qrd.
lishe4 in ILGA EuRoiHr
org:8080/fqrdlassocs/ilga/euroletter/40.html> [hereinafter ILGA EuRoLErr= 40] (describing the action taken by the Commission to create a taskforce to deal with issues surrounding
the free movement of people).
138. See id (noting that the International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA), based in
Copenhagen, Denmark wrote to the chairperson of the group, Simone Veil, raising the issue
of free movement for gay and lesbian people.
For instance, a Danish or Swedish registered couple cannot move to another EU member state and
obtain the same rights as a married couple - as they can in Denmark and Sweden. Even though
there is a provision ofbringing a spouse with you if you as an EU citizen go to another EU country to have ajob, your same-sex spouse is not in general permitted to stay inthe country. ... This
is a main obstacle for the flee movement of gay people.
Id
139. See TATCHELL, supra note 12, at 56-57 (suggesting that gays and lesbians may not
feel free to move into member countries that do not provide the same protections as their
home country).
140. See discussion infra Parts V.B & V.C (discussing which countries provide protections for gays and lesbians in the workplace and recognize same-sex partnerships).
141. See infra note 169 and accompanying text (discussing The Danish Partnership Act
which provides for recognition of same-sex unions).
142. See TATCHELI, supra note 12, at 96 (reviewing Great Britain's stance on homosexual unions). "The law does not recognize committed homosexual relationships. Lesbian and
gay partners therefore have no legal rights with regard to pensions, inheritance, tenancy,
compassionate leave, or next-of-kin visiting rights... ."Id
143. See Case No. 59/85 Netherlands State v. Reed, 1986 E.C.R. 1283, 2 C.M.L.R. 448
(1986) (noting that Articles 10-12(a) of Council Regulation 1612/68, 1968 O.J. Spec. Ed.
(L 257) 2, defines a worker's family as the worker's spouse and his or her descendants but
not unmarried persons who live together). In Ree, the question was whether the term
"spouse" included a cohabitee (in a heterosexual relationship). See id at 1285-86. The
Court held that the term spouse referred to marital relationships only. See id. at 1299-300.
Furthermore, the European Court of Justice found that the Dutch law violated Article 7(2)
of Council Regulation 1612/68 because it allowed unmarried heterosexual partners of
Dutch nationals to stay in the Netherlands, but not the partners of nationals from other
member countries. See id at 1303. See generally SThINER, supra note 53, at 211-12 (discussing the definition of a spouse).
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union would not be allowed to stay in Great Britain with his or her partner,
whereas the British government would allow the spouse in a heterosexual married
couple from Denmark to stay.'"
These laws could violate the spirit of the EC Treaty. These laws and practices,
which prevent gays and lesbians from moving freely throughout the European
Community, could violate Article 3, which requires the "abolition, as between
Member States, of obstacles to freedom of movement for persons."'4" While the
EC Treaty, under Articles 100, 100a and 101, requires action by the European
Commission and the Council of Ministers to approximate the laws of various
countries to promote the free movement of people, 4 6 these institutions have so far
not addressed the issue of free movement of gays and lesbians.'47 The European
Court of Justice can rectify problems surrounding gay and lesbian equality in a
more efficient manner than other European institutions.'48
The European Court of Justice is as concerned about economic integration as
the Commission and Council. It has been faced with many cases that combine
economic integration and equal rights issues, including equal pay cases, similar to
Grant.'49 In the equal pay cases, for example, the European Court of Justice recognized the impact that unequal treatment of men and women had on the economic
goals of the Community.' The economic integration argument, coupled with the
equal treatment argument, was successful; the Court required equal pay for both
men and women in Sabena.'5
Would the result be the same as in Reed if a legally recognized same-sex couple from
Denmark or Sweden moved to the Netherlands? Even if the European Court of Justice fails
to answer that question with Grant, the fact remains that the since the time the European
Court of Justice decided Reed, certain member countries have established legal partnerships
between gay and lesbian couples. This suggests that the definition of a spouse, as defined in
Reed, is once again open for debate. This is a question that the European Court of Justice
may have to address in reaching a decision in Grant. Since Grant involves a same-sex couple, if the court finds discrimination, the decision would seem to protect gays and lesbians
in the workplace, but more specifically it would protect same-sex unions in the workplace.
144. But see Martin, supra note 85, at 437-39 (noting that Great Britain recognizes numerous spouses resulting from polygamous marriages).
145. EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 3(c); see also TATCHmLL, supra note 12, at 68-69 (discussing hypotheticals that indicate how such varied laws among member states would limit
the free movement of people).
146. See supra note 136 (citing the various articles of the EC Treaty).
147. See discussion supra notes 38-67 and accompanying text (noting the failure of the
Commission and the Council of Ministers to recognize the relationship between free
movement of people and discrimination of gays and lesbians and to act on it).
148. Compare discussion supra Part III (discussing the role of the European Court of
Justice in recognizing gay and lesbian problems and addressing and solving these problems)
with discussion supra Parts II.B, II.C, & II.D.
149. See infra note 228 (listing several cases, which combined equal pay and equality
issues with economic integration issues).
150. See, e.g., Sabena, 1976 E.C.R. 455.
151. See id.
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The economic impact resulting from unequal treatment of gays and lesbians in
the European Community indicates how this treatment violates the EC Treaty.
C. HARMONIZATION OF MEIBER COUNTRIES' LAWS
The various laws treating gays and lesbians equally in one member country and
unequally in another have hurt the European Community in reaching its goal of
full economic integration and has limited the free movement of people.5 2 The
European Community has a responsibility to create a unified law by harmonizing
and approximating these conflicting national laws.5 3
The wide variations in the national laws of the... member countries concerning
the rights of homosexuals could, for example, be viewed as violating the Treaty
commitments to the "harmonious development" (Article 2), "closer relations between the States" (Article 2), "approximation of the laws" (Article 3), "establishment of function of the common market" (Article 100), "improved working conditions and . . . their harmonization" (Article 117), "harmonization of social
systems" (Article 117), and "close co-operation" in "employment, labour law and
working conditions" (Article 118)."4
D. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE'S RSPONsImrrY FOR ENSURING THAT THE
EUROPEAN COMIMUNITY OBTAINS THESE GOALS.
Thus far, this Comment has reviewed the various European institutions' and
has concluded that the most promising forum for gays and lesbians is the European
Court of Justice. 5 " While the other institutions have a responsibility to insure
proper integration of the national economies and the creation of a single community, "57
' the European Court of Justice has accepted the responsibility as the guarantor of the integration process.' As such, it should understand how discrimina-

152 See Parts IV.A & IV.B; see also Clapham & Weiler, supra note 1I, at 39-42 (questioning whether the Community's laws toward gays and lesbians allow for free movement
for gays and lesbians); see also TATCHELL, supra note 12, at 55-57 (raising hypotheticals
under Community law that indicate the restrictions placed on gays and lesbians to move
freely).
153. See TATCHELL supranote 12, at 53-55 (citing the EC Treaty, supra note 9, arts., 2,
3, 100, 117, and 118) (requiring a uniform law).
154. Id
155. See discussion supra Parts II& III.
156. See discussion supra Part lI.A (explaining the European Court of Justice's ability
to address the issue of same-sex partnerships and equality for gays and lesbians in Europe).
157. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (discussing the roles of the European
Commission and the Council of Ministers in insuring that the European Community is not
hindered in achieving integration goals and citing the respective articles of the EC Treaty).
158. MAURO CAPPELLETIIErAL., A GENERAL INTRODUCriON, in INTEGRATION THRou H
LAW: EUROPE AND THE Aurmuc FEDERAL Expim CE 30 (Mauro Cappelletti ct a. eds.,
1986).
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tion based on sexual orientation has harmed and will continue to harm integration
and the free movement of people. 59 Arguably, the only way to completely achieve
these goals is to end workplace discrimination against same-sex couples and gays
and lesbians throughout the European Community. The European Court of Justice,
like the other institutions, should assist gays and lesbians in achieving this goal of
equal treatment because they are linked to the goals of the European Community
as set out in the EC Treaty. This is a compelling argument that gays and lesbians
can present to the Court to convince it that inconsistent and varied treatment of
gays and lesbians from one member country to the next has a negative effect upon
European integration. Jacques Delors, former president of the European Commission, declared as much."W
To make this argument, however, it becomes necessary to specify how the
member countries, through their laws, treat gays and lesbians. Because the case of
Lisa Grant involves the treatment of a lesbian partnership (even though not legally
recognized in Great Britain), a review of the same-sex partnership laws of the
member countries is discussed in detail. In addition, a review of workplace discrimination protections for gays and lesbians in member countries is also discussed. The reason for a review of these two areas of law pertaining to gays and
lesbians is twofold: 1) to show how such varied treatment interferes with the economic integration and free movement goals of the Community and 2) because the
European Court of Justice often reviews and considers the various laws of the
member countries in reaching its decision.'

159. See supra Part IV.B (describing the impact that discrimination based on sexual orientation has on economic integration).
160. See supra note 133 (quoting Jacques Delors admitting that social issues, even those
surrounding gays and lesbians, have an effect on economic integration).
161. See Case 13/94 P v. S and Cornwall County Council, 1996 E.C.R. 1-2145 (opinion
of the Advocate-General) (reviewing the laws of various member countries regarding treatment and recognition of transgendered persons); Case C-241/87 Maclaine Watson & Co.,
Ltd. v. Council and Commission, 1990 E.C.R. 1-1797 (reviewing a survey of the member
countries' laws); Case 152/85 Misset v. Council, 1987 E.C.R. 223 (indicating that the Court
reviewed a survey of member countries' laws); Case 69/72 Hansamuhle v. Council, 1973
E.C.R. 1229 (reviewing a survey of member countries' laws); see also Case 249/96, Grant
v. South-West Trains, Ltd., Written Observations of the Respondent, at 13 (citing Case
59/85 Reed v. Netherlands, 1986 E.C.R. 1283) [hereinafter SWT's Written Observations].
In Reed, the European Court of Justice defined "spouse" as found in Council Regulation 1612/68. It did so by reviewing the "variety of practice in different member states as to
the recognition of defacto marriages." Reed, 1986 E.C.R. at 1285. SWT's Written Observations, supra, at 13. The Court in Reed noted that "[w]hen in support of a dynamic interpretation, reference is made to developments in social and legal conceptions, those developments must be visible in the whole of the Community; such an argument cannot be based
on social and legal developments in only one or a few Member States." Reed, 1986 E.C.R.
1283, 1285 (cited in SWT's Written Observations, supra, at 13). A comparison of the laws
relating to de facto marriages considered in Reed and those same-sex partnership laws as
explained in Part V.A of this Comment, indicates how the Court of Justice could fail to expand spouse in Reed, but why it should consider the increase in same-sex partnership laws
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V. GAY AND LESBIAN CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE
RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS IN EUROPE 2
A. RIOTS TO RECOGNrION-THE START OF THE GAY AND LESBIAN CIVIL RIGHTS
MoVEMENT AND RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX UNIONS INTHE EUROPEAN
COMfMUNr1Y

The gay and lesbian civil rights movement in Europe started shortly after World
War I,63 but neither the movement in the United States nor in Europe gained momentum until the Stonewall Riots'" in New York City in 1969 .6S Even so, the gay
and lesbian movement in Europe is further along in promoting acceptance and recognition of same-sex partnerphips than its counterpart in the United States.'
The first country in the world to recognize same-sex partnerships'67 was Denin Grant.

162. For an excellent review of advancements of gays and lesbians in the European
Community see, e.g., Kees Waaldijk, The Legal Situation in the Afember States in
HoMosExuALrrY: A EUROPEAN COmMJNrrY ISSUE, supranote 11, at 70-130; Alan Reckie,
Positive Developments at a NationalLevel in Europe, in ILGA EUROLEnE 44; Comparative Survey of the Legal Situationfor Homosexuals in Europe, in ILGA EUROLErrER 42,
June 1996 (visited Sept. 10, 1997) <http://fglb.qrd.org:8OSOfqrdfassocsfilga!euroletter/
42.html> [hereinafter ILGA EuROLmE 42] (providing a chart listing whether the countries recognize same-sex partnerships, whether there are anti-discrimination laws, age of
consent laws, and whether the country bans homosexuality). See generally TATCHELL, supra note 12, at 84-133.
163. See Astrid A.M. Mattijssen and Charlene L. Smith, Dutch Treat: The Lessons the
US. Can Learn from How the Netherlands Protects Lesbians and Ga s, 4 Am U. J.
GENDER & LAW 303, 310-11 (1996) (describing the creation of the Dutch Scientific Humanitarian Committee, shortly after World War I, after the Dutch Parliament passed a law
outlawing all homosexual contact).
164. See BARRY D. ADAMS, THE RISE OFA GAY AND LESBIAN MOvEMENT 81-124 (1995)

(discussing the Stonewall Riots, which were seen as the catalyst for the gay and lesbian
movement).
165. See MAR'tiN DUBERMNAN, STONEVALL 181-212 (1993) (noting that many consider
the Stonewall Riots, which occurred on June 27-28, 1969, the beginning of the gay and lesbian civil rights movement in the United States). Even though gays and lesbians had been
organizing in Europe for years before the Stonewall Riots, these riots have taken on mythical and legendary status. One gay and lesbian civil rights organizer referred to the riots as
the "hairpin drop heard round the world." EDWARD ALWOOD, STRAIGHT NEWS: GAYS,
LESBIANS AND THE NEWS MEDIA 90 (1996) (citing TOBY MARoTrA, THE PoLmcs OF

HOMOSEXUALrIY 77 (1981)) (explaining that "[the r]eference to dropping hairpins was a
humorous code among gays that goes back to the 1940's). "'He let a hairpin drop' gays
would say, describing a cue someone had given that he was a homosexual." Id.at 339 n.26.
166. Compare infra Part V.A (discussing laws in Europe recognizing same-sex unions)
with supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing the surge in state laws in the United
States denying recognition of same-sex marriages and noting that President Clinton signed
the Defense of Marriage Act).
167. The distinction must be made between same-sex marriagesand same-sex unions or
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partnerships.No country recognizes same-sex marriages. A brief review of the recognition
of same-sex unions in the Netherlands will clarify, to some extent, the distinctions between
the two types of commitments. See generally Kees Waaldijk, Dutch ParliamentDemands
Legislation to Open Up Marriage and Adoption for Same-Sex Couples, in THE LATEST
ABOUT LITING THE BAN ON MARRIAGE FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES INTHE NETHERLANDS (visited Sept. 10, 1997) <http:/www.xs4all.nl/nvihcoc/marriage.html> [hereinafter LIFTING
THE BAN] (discussing the various bills and resolutions in the Dutch Parliament).
First, the national government of the Netherlands recently passed a same-sex partnership law, which will become effective on January 1, 1998, and the government is currently
considering a same-sex marriage law. See Steffen Jensen, PartnershipLaw in the Netherlands, in ILGA EuRoLErrER, 51 June 1997 (visited on Oct. 20, 1997) <http://www.
france.qrd.org/fqrd/assocs/ilga/euroletter/51.html>. Prior to this only certain local jurisdictions within the Netherlands recognized same-sex unions. See TATCHELL, supra note 12, at
122 (indicating that "the legal system doesn't give specific recognition to same-sex partnerships" but certain towns and cities do); see also Waaldijk, supra note 162, at 97 (noting that
towns in the Netherlands have recognized same-sex unions since 1991, but that absent national law these have little legal force). In addition, these towns in the Netherlands recognized same-sex couples for immigration purposes. See TATCHELL, supra note 12, at 122-23
(noting that over fourteen towns sanction same-sex marriages and that "[f]orelgn partners of
Dutch lesbians and gay men have been permitted to immigrate and take up residence with
their lovers on much the same basis as people in heterosexual relationships."). Even absent
the right to marry, in the Netherlands, gay and lesbian couples have rights relating to rent
protection, income tax, and social security. See Rob Tielman & Hans Hammelburg, World
Survey on the Social and Legal Position of Gays and Lesbians, in THE THIRD PINK BOOK: A
GLOBAL VIEw OF LESBIAN AND GAY LIBERATION AND OPPRESSION 308 (Aart Hendriks et al.
eds., 1993). Unlike gay couples, heterosexual couples in the Netherlands possess rights that
gay couples do not-pension, inheritance tax, and adoption rights. See id.
The Dutch Parliament has taken two different steps towards recognition of same-sex
couples. See generally LIFrING THE BAN, supra. It has asked the government to prepare two
bills: one allowing same-sex marriages and the other allowing same-sex couples to adopt.
See id.; see also Michael Odijk, Dutch Second Chamber of ParliamentAgrees on Partnership Registration, in IGLA EUROLFrrER 46, December 1996 (visited Sept. 10, 1997)
<http://fglb.qrd.org:8080/fqrd/assocs/ilga/euroletter/46.html>
[hereinafter
ILGA
EUROLETTER 46] (indicating that the Second Chamber was in favor of opening up civil marriage by a vote of 81 to 60); Alex Spillus, Marriage of Inconvenience; Queen Beatrix Disapproves but Holland and Hawaii Are Set to Legalize Same-Sex Marriage, GUARDIAN
(London), Apr. 20, 1996, at 27 (noting that Queen Beatrix is horrified by the idea, but absent extraordinary intervention the law will be ratified within a year). Because it will be a
long time before the Dutch government, which does not favor same-sex marriage or adoption, acts, the Dutch Parliament introduced bills that would allow registered partnerships,
but not marriage. See LwaNG THE BAN, supra. As noted, the government acted earlier this
year by passing the same-sex partnership bill.
Many have blurred the distinction between the two forms of status, but for the most
part registered partnerships do not include certain rights that married heterosexual couples
enjoy, such as the right to adopt. See LIFTING THE BAN, supra (noting that a registered partnership "will have almost all legal consequences of marriage, with notable exceptions of the
marital status and of any form of parenthood or parental rights and duties"). Unfortunately,
the fact that marriage and partnership are used interchangeably has caused some confusion.
Presently, no law in any country provides same-sex couples with all the rights of marriage.
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mark, which did so in 1989. This law, however, like those that followed it, fell
short of providing same-sex partners the same legal rights married heterosexual
couples have. 69 No country has legalized same-sex marriages. "oInstead those that
No country legally recognizes same-sex marriages. The legislative activity in the Netherlands shows the distinction between the two types of commitment. Yet, it can be confusing
when the parliament asks the government to recognize same-sex marriages, and then also
asks, separately, for the government to give same-sex couples the right of adoption. If the
same-sex couple is legally married, they would already have that right
168. See Gays Legalize Partnerships in Denmark, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 2,
1989, at 6A (noting that a new national law went into effect making Denmark the first
country to legalize homosexual unions). There is confusion as to which country was the
first to recognize same-sex unions. See Danish ParliamentLegalizes Gay Marriages,Cm.
TRm., May 27, 1989, at C3 (suggesting that Sweden preceded Denmark in passing such
legislation). CompareThe Swedish Registered Partnership Act, infra note 174 (signed June
23, 1994) with The Danish Partnership Act, infranote 169 (signed June 7 19S9).
169. Because this Danish act serves as a model for this type of legislation, an English
translation follows:
1.Two persons of the same sex may have their partnership registered.
REGISTRATION

2. - (1) Part I, sections 12 and 13(1) and clause 1of section 13(2) of the Danish Marriage (For-

mation and Dissolution) Act shall apply similarly to the registration of partnerships, ce. subsection
2 ofthis section.
(2) A partnership may only be registered provided both or one of the parties has his permanent residence in Denmark and is of Danish nationality.
(3)The rules governing the procedure of registration of a partnership, including the examination of the conditions for registration, shall be laid down by the Minister ofJusticc.
LEGAL EFFECrs
3.(1) Subject to the exceptions of section 4, the registration of a partnership shall have the

same legal effects as the contracting of marriage.
(2) The Provisions of Danish law pertaining to marriage and spouses shall apply similarly
to registered partnerships and registered partners.
4.- (1)The provisions of the Danish Adoption Act regarding spouses shall not apply to registered partners.
(2) Clause 3 of section 13 and section 15(3) of the Danish Legal Incapacity and Guardianship Act regarding spouses shall not apply to registered partners.
(3)Provisions of Danish law containing special rules pertaining to one of the parties to a
marriage determined by the sex of that person shall not apply to registered partners.
(4) Provisions of international treaties shall not apply to registered partnerships unless th:
other contracting parties agree to such application.
DIssoLuTioN

5.- (1) Parts 3,4, and 5 ofthe Danish Marriage (Formation and Dissolution) Act and Part 42 of
the Danish Administration of Justice Act shall apply similarly to the dissolution of a registered
partnership, cf. subsections 2 and 3 ofthis section.
(2) Section 46 of the Danish Marriage (Formation and Dissolution) Act shall not apply to
the dissolution of a registered partnership.
(3) Irrespective of section 448c of the Danish Administration of Justice Act a registered
partnership may always be dissolved inthis country.
CONSIENCEMENT ETC.

6. This Act shall come into force on October 1, 1989....
The Danish Registered Partnership Act, D/341 H- 1%L Act No. 372 [hereinafter The Danish
Partnership Act] (English translation available at <http'//vy.qrd.org/qrdlworld
/europeldenmark/registered.partnership.act.with.amendments>).
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enacted legislation utilized the quasi-status of partnership." While similar to marriage, a partnership does not have all of the same benefits that are associated with
marriage. 7 Specifically, the Danish Partnership Act denies same-sex couples the
right to adopt children,' as do other partnership laws which are modeled after the
Danish Partnership Act. 74 Nevertheless, gays and lesbians took advantage of the
law and the benefits' as registered partners under the Danish Partnership Act. 76
Following Denmark's lead, in 1994, Sweden became the next European Community member country to pass a same-sex partnership law, which was virtually
identical to Denmark's law."

Gay and lesbian Swedes also enthusiastically re-

170. See Waaldijk, supra note 162, at 91 (noting that "[i]n all Member States marriage is
a form of legally registered partnership between one woman and one man.").
171. See, e.g., Waaldijk, supra note 162, at 96 (describing the creation of the registered
partnership).
172. See discussion supra note 167 (distinguishing between same-sex marriages and
same-sex partnerships).
173. The Danish Partnership Act, supra note 169, § 4(1) (prohibiting registered partnerships from utilizing the Danish Adoption Act); see also Recognized Partnership Law, 564
(1995-96) § 6 [hereinafter The Iceland Partnership Act] (English translation available at
<http://fglb.qrd.org:8080/fqrd/texts/partnership/iceland-bill.html>) (noting that Iceland's
partnership law also denies same-sex couples the right to adopt children).
174. See The Registered Partnership [Family Law] Act, Ch. 3 § 2 [hereinafter The
Swedish Partnership Act] (English translation obtained from the Embassy of Sweden, copy
on file with the author) (barring either partner of a same-sex partnership from adopting a
child); Bill on Registered Partnerships, 1993-04-30 #40 § 4 [hereinafter The Norwegian
Partnership Act] (English translation available at <http://www.stud.unit.no/studorg/ilh/ilh
/english/partnership.html>) (noting that the Adoption Act does not apply to registered partnerships).
175. See The Danish Partnership Act, supra note 169, § 3(1) (indicating that same-sex
couples under the Act receive the same benefits as married couples, with certain exceptions,
specifically that same-sex couples are not allowed to adopt); see also Lou Chibbaro, Jr.,
1,049 Laws Affect Married Couples, GAO Says, WASH. BLADE, Feb. 21, 1997, at 17 (describing a United States Government Accounting Office study concluding that there are
1,049 federal laws that provide benefits based on a person's marital status); Baehr v. Lewin,
852 P.2d 44, 59 (Haw. 1993) (describing the legal benefits of marriage in the United
States).
176. See Denmark Counts 648 Gay Marriagesin 1990, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, Apr.
19, 1990, at 4A (noting that numerous same-sex couples entered into partnerships in the
first three months after the law went into affect). But see Happy to be a Bachelor Boy?,
OBSERVER (London), May 12, 1996, at 8 (describing gays and lesbians who do not plan to
marry even if it is legal); Evert Van Der Veen & Adrianne Dercksen, The Social Situation
in the Member States, in HoMosExuALrrY: A EuRoPEAN COMMUNrrY ISSUE, supra note 11,
at 143 (noting that a debate continues in the gay and lesbian community regarding same-sex
marriages). "Some lesbians and gay men see marriage as an institution which reinforces the
unequal position of women and of homosexuals in this society; not an institution they
would want to emulate." Id.
177. See The Swedish Partnership Act, supra note 174, ch. 3, § 1 (providing benefits to
same-sex couples, similar to the benefits found in the Danish Partnership Act); see also A
Renewed Pushfor Gay Marriage,PHILADELPrIA INQUIRER, Oct. 19, 1994 (reporting that on
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ceived this law,178 even though it did not allow adoption and other rights associated
with marriage.17 For example, the Swedish Partnership Act denied same-sex couples the right to be guardians or to have children through artificial insemination.IW
In the European Community, the Netherlands has become the third member
country to pass a same-sex partnership law.' Perhaps even more interesting, the
Netherlands could still become the first country to pass a same-sex marriage
law.18
In addition to these European Community countries, several other European
countries, specifically-Norway,"a Iceland,' and Hungary"'-have adopted
same-sex partnership laws. As recognition of same-sex unions explodes in Europe,
more countries, both within and outside of the European Community, are considering legislation to legalize same-sex unions.'
In addition to the European countries that already passed partnership legislation, six European Community member countries are considering partnership legislation-Belgium,8 7 Luxembourg,'88 Finland,"' France,' Spain, 9' and PortuJanuary 1, 1995 Sweden will "become the third country to sanction same-sex marriages").
178. See 85 Gay Couples Use New Same-Sex MarriageLav, AGmmcE FRANCE PRESSE,
Mar. 16, 1995, availablein, LEXIS News Library, Cumws File (noting that in the first two
months after The Swedish Partnership Act was in force, 85 same-sex couples took advantage of the new law).
179. See The Swedish Partnership Act, supra note 174, ch. 3, § 4 (limiting the legal
rights of these newly recognized same-sex partnerships). But see Swedes Ponder Gay
Adoptions, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Mar. 6, 1997 available in, LEXIS News Library,
Curnws File (noting that in a recent seminar experts agreed that gays and lesbians make "as
good parents as heterosexuals, but were split over their right to adoption").
180. See The Swedish Partnership Act, supranote 174, ch. 3, §§ 2-3.
181. See discussion supra note 167 (discussing same-sex partnerships in the Netherlands
and that the Netherlands has become the third European Community country to pass a
same-sex partnership law).
182. See discussion supra note 167 (noting that Hawaii and the Netherlands both are
considering providing same-sex marriage rights to gays and lesbians).
183. See The Norwegian Partnership Act, supra note 174.
184. See The Iceland Partnership Act, supranote 173.
185. See Sandor Borso, Hungary is Set to Legalize Same-Sex Partnerships,in ILGA
EuRoLrrnI. 41, supra note 32 (describing the way in which the Hungarian government
established its same-sex law). Hungary adopted a same-sex partnership law after a surprise
decision by the Constitutional Court, which ruled that "the non-recognition of same-sex
couples [violated] the Constitution of Hungary." Id The Constitutional Court called on the
government to "cease discrimination within a year." IdBut see Kurt Krickler, Homosexuality in Eastern Europe, in ILGA EuROLETrER 43, supra note 32 (noting that the Hungarian
Constitution fails to specifically list sexual orientation as a protected class).
186. See discussion infra notes 187-201 and accompanying text (discussing the expansion of legislation that would recognize same-sex unions).
187. See Michelle Lamensch, Le Contrat De Vie Commun Lierait Des Amis, des Parents, LE Sone, July 19, 1996, translated in Belgium: PartnershipBill Progress, in ILGA
EuRoLEi m 43, supra note 32 (describing the introduction of the partnership bill in Belgium).
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gal'---and at least one non-Community country, Switzerland, is also considering
same-sex partnership legislation." The Spanish Parliament most recently acted oil
this issue passing a request for the government to consider a relatively less stringent partnership bill that provides gay couples access to health care benefits, to
state widower's pensions, and to alimony in a separation situation.' This bill, like
the others, does not include any adoption rights, whereas a prior gay partnership
bill failed in March of 1997, before the same parliament, perhaps because that bill
included an adoption provision." 5
188. See Rex Wockner, Gay Marriage Proposedin Luxembourg, in ILGA EUROLETrER
42, supra note 162 (noting that "Green Party MP Renee Wagener introduced a bill in the
Luxembourg Parliament May 9 to legalize full gay marriage.").
189. See Hannelee Lehtikuusi, The Finnish PartnershipBill, in ILGA EUROLErrER 43.

supranote 32 (describing the introduction of the partnership bill in Finland).
190. See Jane Ferguson, Government Promises Gays PartnerBenefits, WASH. BLADE,
July 4, 1997, at 12 (discussing the recent passage of a parliamentary bill seeking a universal
partnership law); Alan Reekie, French Minister on Contract of Civil Union, in ILGA

EUROLETrER 52 Aug. 1997 (visited Oct. 10, 1997)<http://www.france.qrd.org/fqrd/assocs/
ilga/euroletter/52.html> (describing a universal partnership contract that would recognize
various partnership arrangements).
191. See infra notes 194-195 (discussing the status of the same-sex partnership bill in
Spain).
192. See Goncalo Diniz, Proposal for a Portuguese Partnership Law, in ILGA

EUROLErrER 51, supra note 167 (noting that the Portuguese Parliament is considering a
same-sex partnership law).
193. See Frederic Ballenegger, Switzerland and Gay Partnership,in ILGA EUROLETIER

41, supra note 32 (noting that Switzerland will receive a Justice Commission report examining a law project for gay partnership recognition). A petition was "brought to the Parliament last year by the national G/L organization, Pink Cross, to urge the authorities towards
gay partnership under Scandinavian principles." Id.; see also Marcel Ryser, Equal Civil
Rights for Same Sex Couples in Switzerland, in IGLA EuRoLETrER 43, supra note 32 (re-

porting that the Swiss Parliament instructed the government to provide gays and lesbians
with legally recognized partnerships).
194. See Jane Ferguson, ParliamentPasses PartnersBill, WASH. BLADE, June 6, 1997

(noting that the Spanish Parliament voted 165 to 159 to approve a gay partnership bill).
This reporting is not exactly correct. Spain has not adopted a gay partnership bill, instead
Parliament has asked the government to look into such a law. This is similar to the action
taken by the Dutch parliament, which later resulted in passage of a same-sex partnership
law.
195. See id. See generally Caesar Cleston, Spanish Socialist Party Has Submitted a
PartnershipLaw to Spanish Parliament, in ILGA EUROLETrER 46, supra note 167 (de-

scribing the introduction of the bill in the Spanish Parliament). That Spanish bill proposed a
partnership law similar to Denmark's. See id. See supra note 169 for an English translation
of The Danish Partnership Act. The initial bill provided "pension, inheritance, fiscal and
other similar benefits to heterosexual as well as to gay/lesbian partnerships." Id. The Spanish Socialist party included the right of adoption in the draft law. See id. That bill, however,
failed after two votes on the bill each ended in a tie, and a third vote finally defeated the bill
161-163. See Caesar Cleston, Spanish ParliamentDebate on PartnershipBill Has Put the
Government in a Difficult Position, in ILGA EUROLEr

49, Apr. 1997 (visited Sept. 10,
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While passage is likely in France196 and Spain,'97 the chance of passage of partnership laws in the remaining countries varies.19' However, even if only Spain and
France pass legislation legalizing same-sex partnerships, one-third of all European
Community countries will recognize same-sex partnerships.
Furthermore, there is the strong possibility that the Netherlands could become
the first country in the world to recognize same-sex marriage." Regardless of the
outcome of the same-sex partnership bills in member countries, the eight-year
trend within the European Community and also throughout the world"' has been
toward the recognition of same-sex partnerships. Since the European Court of Justice often considers the laws of the member countries when deciding cases,"0 ' The
European Court of Justice should consider this trend when deciding a case involving discrimination against not only a lesbian but discrimination against a
same-sex couple.2 Grantis just as much a case about equal pay for a gay man or
lesbian, as it is about equal treatment for same-sex couples in the European Community.20 3

1997) <http./fgrb.qrd.org:8080/fqrdlassocsilgafeuroletter/49.html>. It is also interesting to
note that Spain previously passed at least three laws that protect gays and lesbians and even
recognizes de-facto couples, regardless of their sexual orientation. See Pere Cruells, Law in
Spain Recognizes De-facto Couples, in ILGA EuRoLmrE 39, supra note 15 (describing
the laws Spain has already adopted that protect gays and lesbians).
196. See supra note 190 (indicating that the French government plans a liberal partnership or union law).
197. See discussion supra notes 194-195 and accompanying text (discussing the passage
of a partnership bill in Spain).
198. See, e.g., Lou Chibarro, Jr., Clinton Appoints Gay Man to Post as Ambassador,
WASI. BLADE, Oct. 10, 1997, at 1, 27 (noting that the Luxembourg Parliament is considering the same-sex marriage bill, but that passage of the bill is not expected in the near future).
199. See supra note 167 (discussing the possibilities that the Netherlands could be the
first country in the world to recognize same-sex marriages,perhaps before Hawaii).
200. See discussion infraParts V.B & V.C (discussing the rights and protections of gays
and lesbians in the workplace and recognition of same-sex unions).
201. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which the European
Court of Justice has considered the growth of a particular area of law in various member
states).
202. See P, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-2149 (Opinion of Advocate-General) (noting that the Court
reviewed the member countries' laws on the issue of transgendered persons); see also supra
note 161 (listing cases where the court surveyed member countries' laws). For a useful description of the relationship between the Advocates-General and the Judges of the European
Court of Justice as well as an indication of the authority of these opinions, see STEINEr, supra note 53, at 14. Even though the Advocate-General's opinion is published regardless of
whether his or her opinion is the same as the Court's, both the Court and Advocate-General
Tesauro reached the same conclusion in P.See P, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-2160.
203. See SWT's Written Observations, supra note 161 (stating that the applicant claims
a benefit intended specifically for married employees (whether the marriage is legal or at
common law)).
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B. PROTECTION FOR GAYS AND LESBIANS AROUND THE WORLD

In addition to these advancements, progress has been made in countries
throughout the world to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. 2"
Some countries have even included protections for gays and lesbians in their Constitutions."' Other countries have passed legislation that protects gays and lesbians
from discrimination in the workplace, in housing, and in other areas.2" The United
States, at least on a national level, is not a leading country, in recognizing samesex unions, or in prohibiting discrimination against gays and lesbians. 0 7 On a state
and local level, however, legislation in the United States has been passed in numerous jurisdictions providing protections for gays and lesbians.20 '
204. See generally WINTEMUTE, supra note 123, at app. II, 265-67 (listing countries that
have protections).
205. See id. (noting that at least three countries, Brazil, Germany and South Africa, include in their constitutions anti-discrimination language protecting people based on sexual
orientation); see also Clapham & Weiler, supra note 11, at 14 n.9 (noting that the Dutch
Constitution includes a ban on any grounds whatsoever which supposedly includes discrimination based on sexual orientation). But see Jane Ferguson, Poland: Constitution Bans
Gay Marriage,WASH. BLADE, June 27, 1997, at 12 (noting that Polish voters approved a
new constitution that prohibits Gay marriages). Prior to this vote, Poland was considering
adding language to the new constitution that would protect gays and lesbians. See id. (noting "[t]he original clause on human rights in the new constitution included sexual orientation, but the Catholic Church reportedly demanded that the clause be removed. . . ."). But
see Marcel Ryser, Switzerland: Gay and Lesbians Are Second-Class Citizens, in ILGA
EUROLErrER 46, supra note 167 (noting that the Swiss Government's proposal for the new
Swiss Constitution did not incorporate the views of various organizations and citizens requesting an expansion of Article 7 of the new Constitution to include sexual orientation
with race, religion, gender, and other aspects, which are listed under the article on antidiscrimination). See Goncalo Diniz, Anti-DiscriminationClause in PortugueseConstitution,
in ILGA EUROLErrER 41, supra note 32 (discussing the consideration of Portugal's adoption of anti-discrimination language for gays and lesbians in its constitution).
This Comment uses the same logic expressed by Nuno Baltazar Mendez and suggests
that, protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation, especially discrimination
of same-sex couples in the workplace, will eventually lead to recognition of same-sex unions. See id.
206. See WuGEMurE, supra note 123, at app. II, 265-67 (listing those countries that
provide protections for gays and lesbians). Certain territories or provinces in Australia and
Canada have passed legislation prohibiting such discrimination. See id Moreover, countries
such as Denmark, France, Ireland, Israel, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden have national laws prohibiting such discrimination. See Grant's Written Observations,
supra note 6, at 34 (reviewing laws of various European countries that protect against discrimination based on sexual orientation).
207. See supra note 166 (comparing gay and civil rights in United States with the rights
of gays and lesbians in Europe).
208. See WRTWrrEuT, supra note 123, at. app. III, 268-69 (listing jurisdictions in the
United States that provide protection for gays and lesbians). States prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination include: California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Hawaii,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, Vermont and Wisconsin. See id In addition, the
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Governments across Europe and around the world are beginning to recognize
gays and lesbians and are starting to provide them with equal protection and benefits.2o The European Court of Justice should consider this increase in the number
of laws protecting gays and lesbians and the increase in the number of jurisdictions
that recognize unions of same-sex couples when deciding Grant.2t 0
C. WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION PROTECTIONS IN EUROPEAN COmmUNITY

COUNTRIES
Discrimination similar to SWT's conduct toward Lisa Grant is illegal in seven
European Community countries: Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden.21 France was the first country in the European Community to protect gays and lesbians in the workplace.P2 2 Interestingly, SWT cites to
a case in a French court that held that homosexual unions are not equivalent to heterosexual marriages.2P 3 Yet, SWT fails to point out that that case was decided in
1989. Since then, France became the first country to pass legislation protecting
gays in the workplace (whether in a partnership or not).21 4 Furthermore, SWT
failed to note that the new French government is taking steps to pass same-sex
partnership legislation."'
The fact that nearly half of the member countries protect gays and lesbians in
the workplace is another factor the European Court of Justice should consider
when reaching its decision. As it has in the past, the European Court of Justice has
surveyed member countries' treatment of a particular subject during its decision
making. This case should be no exception.

following cities in the United States also protect gays and lesbians from employment discrimination: Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Denver, Detroit, Kansas City, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, New Orleans, New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Portland, Saint Louis, San Diego, San Francisco, and Seattle. See id
209. See id at app. II, 265-67 (indicating growth of protections since 1989, when Denmark passed its same-sex partnership law).
210. The Advocate-General in P reviewed the growth of laws in member countries regarding transgendered persons. See P, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-2149 (opinion of the AdvocateGeneral); see also supranote 161 (listing cases in which the court reviewed a survey of the
national laws on the particular topic before the Court).
211. See Grant's Written Observations, supra note 6, at 34 (citing W\INTe.iumr, supra
note 123); see also WVaaldijk, supra note 162, at 105 (discussing the creation of workplace
anti-discrimination legislation by France and the Netherlands). But see Waaldijk, supranote
162, at 106-08 (noting that several courts in the member countries have allowed discrimination against gays and lesbians in the workplace).
212. SeeWaaldijk, supranote 162, at 100-06.
213. SWT's Written Observations, supra note 161, at 15 (citing Waaldijk, supra note
162, at 100, n.148).
214. See Waaldijk, supranote 162, at 100-106
215. See Ferguson, supra note 190, at 12 (discussing the new French Governments decision to fulfill a campaign promise to gays and lesbians by providing them with a same-sex
partnership laiv).
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To summarize, Part V of this Comment has provided an updated survey of
member countries' laws regarding gays and lesbians. SWT, in its written observations, suggested that this information was necessary in deciding this case, but
failed to provide this information, perhaps, because this information supports a
finding in favor of Lisa Grant.216
VI. ANALYSIS OF GRANT v. SOUTH- WEST TRAINS, LTD.
So far, this Comment has discussed in detail the reasons and factors that the
European Court of Justice should, and normally does, consider in reaching its decisions. Part VI outlines the facts of Lisa Grant's case and the arguments made by
both sides, incorporating many of the arguments made in this Comment.
A. FACTS
Lisa Grant challenged SWT's refusal to provide her lesbian partner with travel
benefits.. 7 and brought an action before the Southampton Industrial Tribunal in
Great Britain.218 The person who previously held Lisa Grant's position, Mr. Potter,
obtained these travel benefits for his unmarried female companion after they had
lived together for two years." 9 Lisa Grant and her partner lived together in a relationship for over two years prior to asking for the travel benefits, yet SWT denied
them these benefits." 0 Lisa Grant and SWT both agree that SWT denied her these
travel benefits because she and her partner are lesbians. 2 Lisa Grant sued SWT
for this denial. Without deciding the case, the Industrial Tribunal referred the case,
with questions, to the European Court of Justice asking that Court to determine if
Article 119 of the EC Treaty prevents this kind of discrimination." The questions
referred to the European Court of Justice are as follows:
1. Is it (subject to (6) below) contrary to the principle of equal pay for men and
women established by Article 119 of the Treaty establishing the European Community and by Article I of Council Directive 75/117 for an employee to be refused travel concessions for an unmarried cohabiting same-sex partner where such
concessions are available for spouses or unmarried opposite sex cohabiting partners of such an employee?

216. See SWT's Written Observations, supra note 161, at 14 (noting that SWT "has not
been able to conduct a fully up-to-date survey of the extent of recognition of same-sex partnerships in all member states").
217. See Vicky Powell, Rail Company Gives Travel Perks for Gay Employees, GAY

TIrMES, Jan. 1997, at 53 (reporting that another spin-off of British Rail, Great Western
Trains, announced that it will give gay and lesbian partners the same travel benefits it gives
to heterosexual couples).
218. See Grant's Written Observations, supra note 6, at 2.
219. See id.
220. See id
221. See id.

222. See Grant's Written Observations, supra note 6, at 2-3.
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2. For the purposes of Article 119, does "discrimination based on sex" include
discrimination based on the employee's sexual orientation?
3. For the purpose of Article 119 does "discrimination based on sex" include discrimination based on the sex of that employee's partner?
4. If the answer to question (1) is yes, does an employee, to whom such concessions are refused, enjoy a directly enforceable community right against his employer?
5. Is such a refusal contrary to the provisions of Council Directive 761207?
6. Is it open to an employer to justify such refusal if he can show (a) that the purpose of the concessions in question is to confer benefits on married partners or
partners in an equivalent position to married partners and (b) that relationships
between same-sex cohabiting partners have not traditionally been, and are not
generally regarded by society as equivalent to marriage; rather than on the basis
of an22 economic or organizational reason relating to the employment in question?
B. LISA GRANT'S ARGUMENTS
1. The Acts by South-West Trains Constitute Sex Discrimination, in
Violation of Article 119 of the EC Treaty
Because neither the EC Treaty nor British law explicitly provide protection
from sexual orientation discrimination, 4 Lisa Grant relies heavily on Article
119' of the EC Treaty, arguing that SWT discriminated'2 against her.m She ar223. Id
224. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (noting the limits of Article 119 and the
Sex Discrimination Act).
225. See EC Treaty, supranote 9 art. 119. Article 119 states:
Each Member State shall during the first stage ensure and subsequently maintain the application

of the principle that men and women should receive equal pay for equal work. For the purpose of
this article, 'pay' means the ordinary basic or minimum wage or salary and any other considera-

tion, whether in cash or inkind, which the worker receives, directly or indirectly, in respect of his
employment from his employer.

Id
226. See Grant's Written Observations, supra note 6, at 5.Lisa Grant submits that:
(a) Travel concessions are pay within the meaning of Article 119. This point was conceded by
South-West Trains before the Industrial Tribunal.

(b)Article 119 creates directly effective rights for employees.
(c)
Since the case involves "pay" covered by Article 119, the Equal Treatment Directive is in applicable; equal treatment is assured under Article 119.
Id (footnotes omitted).
227. See Grant's Written Observations, supra note 6, at 20 (noting that "[s]pecial vigilance is called for in ensuring that this occurs in relation to women who have characteristics
which render them particularly vulnerable to discrimination resulting from subjective preju-
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gues that SWT denied her the same benefits a man in her position received, in
violation of Article 11 9228
In any sex discrimination case, to determine if discrimination has occurred, a
comparison must be made between a man and a woman to determine if the employer treated the woman differently from the man or vice versa. Both sides in this
case disagreed on the type of comparison that the Court of Justice should make.22 9
SWT argues that the proper comparison should be between Lisa Grant, a lesbian,
and a gay male in the same position, so that SWT could rightly deny either the gay
man or the lesbian woman the travel benefits." The Southampton Industrial Tribunal and the European Court of Justice, however, have rejected arguments similar
to SWT's arguments."2
dices."). Lisa Grant focuses on the fact that as a woman and a lesbian she is more susceptible to discrimination than a heterosexual male or gay man. See id. Furthermore, Lisa Grant
notes that empirical research shows that women are more at risk of sex discrimination. See
id. at 21. While this focus perhaps strengthens her argument for the type of comparison she
makes, it could have a negative impact on the breadth of the decision from the European
Court of Justice. This not only provides an opportunity for the European Court of Justice to
limit its responses to lesbians, but it shines a spot light on a division between lesbians and
gay men. The strength of the Court's reasoning regarding the comparison in P should make
Lisa Grant's focus on the distinctions between lesbians and gay men unnecessary.
228. See Grant's Written Observations, supra note 6, at 4-6 (arguing that SWT discriminated against her); cf Sabena, 1976 E.C.R. 455 (noting that Article 119 prohibits discrimination between men and women in both public as well as private contract situations); Case
129/79, Macarthy's Ltd. v. Smith, 1980 E.C.R. 1275 (dealing with the member states' obligations to ensure equal pay for equal work under Article 119 of the EC Treaty); Case 96/80,
Jenkins v. Kingsgate Ltd., 1981 E.C.R. 911 (regarding equal pay in part-time employment
situations); Case 12/81, Garland v. British Rail Eng'g Ltd., 1982 E.C.R. 359 (resolving an
issue similar to the instant case-concluding that providing rail travel benefits to men, but
not women, after retirement violated Article 119 of the EC Treaty). For an excellent summary of these and other leading cases in equal treatment law in the European Community,
see generally DmECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EMPLOYMENT, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND
SOCIAL AFFAIRS, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 112. Lisa Grant's argument, that if she

were a man in a relationship with a woman she would have received the benefits, is indisputable. The employee in her position prior to her was a man who received spousal travel
benefits for his unmarried female companion. See Grant's Written Observations, supra note
6, at 4-6.
229. See Grant's Written Observations, supra note 6,at 8 (describing the comparisons
each party suggested).
230. See id. at 8, 23 (analogizing the SWT comparison (discriminatory treatment for
both a gay male and a lesbian) with that of Virginia's argument in Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967), a case in which the Commonwealth of Virginia argued that a ban on interracial marriages would equally affect whites and blacks).
231. See id. at 8 (arguing that the proper approach to a sex discrimination case is "to
change only the sex of the applicant and to hold all other circumstances constant"). When
this test is applied, she argues that sex discrimination is obvious. See id. SWT argues that a
different comparison is appropriate, suggesting that the comparison should be between a
lesbian in that position versus a gay man in that position. See id. The European Court of
Justice, however, rejected that type of argument in P v. S and Cornwall County Council.
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Having concluded that the European Court of Justice will most likely adopt the
proposition that the proper comparison is between Lisa Grant and a male, excluding any reference to sexual orientation, 2 Lisa Grant argues that this comparison
shows SWT's blatant discrimination in violation of Article 119. She bases her
argument on the facts--Mr. Potter, a male, received travel benefits' for his unmarried female companion. " l Lisa Grant, a female in the same position as Mr.
Potter, was denied travel benefits for her female companion. 2 6 To conclude that
this violates Article 119 of the EC Treaty requires no great manipulation of the
definition of sex discrimination." Because this activity results in treating a woman
differently than a man, with no objective justificatione for this differential treatment, it violates Article 119 of the EC Treaty.
SWT's justification for not providing Lisa Grant with the same benefits as her
male predecessor is that she is a lesbian; 9 this is unbridled prejudice.4 SWT's
See P,1996 E.C.R. at 1-2153-54. The court rejected an argument that a sex discrimination
case regarding a transgendered female (a person who was bom male) should be compared to
a transgendered male (a person bom female). See id Instead, the court held that the proper
comparison is male against female, regardless of prior gender. See id; see also Sex Discrimination Act, supra note 9, § 5 (noting that the comparison "must be such that the relevant circumstances in the one case are the same, or not materially different, in the other").
232. See Grant's Written Observations, supra note 6, at 9 (suggesting that to consider
sexual orientation in this comparison would be contrary to the principle of equal treatment).
233. See id at 7-10.
234. See, e.g., Defrenne, 1971 E.C.R. 445 (considering travel benefits as pay for purposes of Article 119 analysis); Case 12/81, Garland v. British Rail Eng'g, 1982 E.C.R. 359
(same).
235. See Grant's Written Observations, supranote 6, at 8.
236. See idat 2.
237. See Grant's Written Observations, supra note 6, at 8 (noting that "[s]uch an approach is factually accurate and requires no purposive construction of Article 119 in order
to provide redress.").
238. See Case 170/84, Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v. Weber von Harz, 1986 E.C.R. 1607
(holding that an employer can discriminate between sexes if the measure is objectively justified). "If one can prove that the discriminatory measures correspond to a genuine need of
the enterprise, are suitable for obtaining the objective pursued by the enterprise, and are
necessary for that purpose the courts will allow this discrimination." STErNER, supra note
53, at 211. In Bilka-Kauihaus, unlike Grant,the state proved that its welfare-type program,
which caused unintentional discrimination against women was objectively justified. See id
239. See Grant's Written Observations, supra note 6, at 7 (arguing that "South-West
Trains claims an entitlement to discriminate against Lisa Grant and her partner and asserts
that Community Law provides no constraint or protection in the circumstances of the present case.").
240. See idt at 7 (noting that if "South-West Trains were correct, unmarried men and
women employees living with same sex partners could receive a lower hourly rate of pay
than those living with opposite sex partners and yet have no remedy under EC law against
this blatantly unequal policy"). In P the employer reasoned that it fired a transgendered person because she was redundant. See P,1996 E.C.R. at 1-2147 (opinion of the AdvocateGeneral). In Grant, the reasoning SWT puts forth is that the employee is a lesbian. See
Grant's Written Observations, supra note 6, at 2. If the European Court of Justice can con-
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justification for the differential treatment of men and woman is based on sexual
1 ' Lisa
orientation. This form of discrimination cannot be objectively justified.24
Grant has a strong argument that SWT's actions are the type of sex discrimination
that Article 119 protects against. If this argument fails, however, Lisa Grant has
suggested an alternative argument-the European Court of Justice should interpret
sex discrimination broadly to include protection from sexual orientation discrimination."

2. The European Court of Justice Should Interpret Sex Discrimination
Broadly to Include Sexual Orientation Discrimination
While Lisa Grant focuses on the facts of her case, which constitute sex discrimination," she also makes a strong alternative argument that the European
Court of Justice should interpret sex discrimination to include discrimination based
on sexual orientation.2' A recent decision from the European Court of Justice, P v.

S and Cornwall County Council,may be helpful to this argument.24

elude that transgendered persons are protected under Article 119, by refusing to accept an
"object justification" for firing a transgendered employee, the Court could clearly find that
Article 119 protects gays and lesbians from the direct discrimination found in Grant v.
South-West Trains, Ltd. The Advocate-General in P dismissed the argument that redundancy was the reason for the dismissal in one terse sentence--"[t]he Industrial Tribunal
found that, whilst there was a case for redundancy, the true reason for the dismissal was the
Council's objection to P's intention to undergo a gender-reassignment operation." P, 1996
E.C.R. at 1-2147 (opinion of the Advocate-General).
241. See Case 30/85, Teuling v. Bedrijsvereiniging voor de Chemische Industrie, 1987
E.C.R. 2497 (discussing a supplemental income program that indirectly discriminated
against women); cf TAMARA K HERvEY, JUSTMICAIONS FOR SEX DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT 73-75 (1993) (discussing various cases in which the European Court of Justice found that there were objective justifications for denying two sets of people different
pay). The Court of Justice balanced the purpose for the legislation and the indirect discrimination it caused and found that "the mere fact that the system of allowances favours a much
greater number of male workers cannot be regarded as an infringement of the principle of
equal treatment." Id.; see also Bilka-Kaujhaus, 1986 E.C.R. 1607; Case 96/80 Jenkins v.
Kingsgate Ltd., 1981 E.C.R. 911.
242. See Grant's Written Observations, supra note 6, at 6 (arguing that "the word sex
should be read as encompassing sexual orientation and, accordingly, Article 119 protects
Lisa Grant against [sexual orientation] discrimination.").
243. See Grant's Written Observations, supra note 6, at 2-6 (relying on the facts for a
sex discrimination argument).
244. See id.
245. See P, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-2153 (opinion of the Advocate-General) (noting that "[the
Advocate-General] regard[s] as obsolete the idea that the law should take into consideration, and protect, a woman who has suffered discrimination in comparison with a man, or
vice versa but denies that protection to those who are discriminatedagainst, again by the
reason of sex, merely because they fall outside the traditional man/woman classification.").
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a. P v. S and CornwallCounty Council
The issue referred to the European Court of Justice in P was whether discrimination based on a person's transgendered24 status constituted sex discrimination.2 7
The European Court of Justice decided this case only two days before the Southampton Industrial Tribunal heard Lisa Grant's case.243 P is probably the strongest
authority for either of Lisa Grant's arguments because it shows the Court's willingness to protect sexual minorities from discrimination.249
In P,which like Grant is an Article 177 case,0 the question before the European Court of Justice was whether Council Directive 76/207, which protects persons from being terminated because of their sex, either male or female, would
protect a transgendered person from being fired because of his or her status as a
transgendered person.sl The Court held that discrimination based on gender reassignment status was sex discrimination.P
246. This Comment uses transsexual and transgendered interchangeably. For a definition
of transgendered, see supra note 102.
247. See P, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-2145-46 (opinion of the Advocate-General) (describing the
issue before the Court of Justice and the focus on the interpretation of Council Directive
76/207); see also Council Directive 76/207, 1976 O.J. (L 39) 40 [hereinafter Council Directive 761207].
248. See Allison Clarke, Gender Case is Just the Ticket; A Lesbian Railway Worker
Who Took Legal Action Afrer Her Partner Was Denied a Free Travel Pass May End Up
Changing OutdatedLaws, INDEPENDENT (London), June 5, 1996, at 20 (reporting that Lisa
Grant's solicitor indicated that the P decision, handed down two days before Grant was
heard by the Southampton Industrial Tribunal, would be helpful to Grant because of the
broad interpretation of the ban on sex discrimination in the Council directive).
249. See P,1996 E.C.R. at 1-2165 (deciding in such a way as to protect transgendered
persons and expand Article 119).
250. See P,1996 E.C.R. at 1-2145 (opinion of the Advocate-General) (indicating that
this is an Article 177 case); see also discussion supra Part III.A.1 (explaining the process
for referring a question to the European Court of Justice under Article 177).
251. See P, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-2145-48 (opinion of the Advocate-General) (including the
questions referred to the European Court of Justice); Council Directive 761207, supra note
247, art. 1. The questions referred to the European Court of Justice in P are similar to those
in Lisa Grant's case. In P the Court is asked:
(I) Having regard to the purpose of Directive 761207 which is stated inArticle Ito put into effect
the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, etc...

Does the dismissal of a transsexual for a reason related to gender reassignment constitute a breach
ofthe Directive?
(2) Does Article 3 of the Directive, which refers to discrimination on grounds of sex, prohibit
treatment of an employee on the grounds of the employee's transsexual state?
P, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-2148 (opinion of the Advocate-General). The Council Directive clearly
spells out the discrimination it is trying to protect people from: "the principle of equal
treatment shall mean that there shall be no discrimination whatsoever on grounds of sex either directly or indirectly by reference in particular to marital or family status." Council Directive 76/207, supra note 247, art. 2(l).
252. See supra note 102 (defining transsexualism).
253. See P, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-2165 (holding that sex discrimination includes discrimina-
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In reaching its decision in P, the European Court of Justice reviewed several issues, including those raised in parts IV and V of this Comment. Furthermore, the
Advocate-General's opinion examined the laws of the member countries, as well
as the goals and objectives of the European Community when formulating his decision." 4 In reaching his conclusion, the Advocate-General reviewed the laws of
member countries on the issue of transgendered persons.2"' Some member countries have laws that protect transgendered persons, other countries only allow this
type of medical procedure to change the gender of the person, but do not allow a
transgendered person to change his birth certificate to reflect the new gender. 3 6
Regardless, this analysis of member countries' laws suggests that in Grant the
Court will review not only recognition of same-sex partnership laws, but antidiscrimination laws protecting gays and lesbians in the workplace.2 7 In addition,
in P, the European Court of Justice also examined the goals of the European
Community, specifically the harmonization of living and working conditions.3 8 It
concluded that the protections of the Council directive should protect "all workers
259
... including those who have changed [their] sex ....
In P, both the Court and the Advocate-General interpreted the Council directive
broadly to ensure that transgendered persons fell under the directive's protection.2" It is this language and reasoning2 6' that is so helpful to Lisa Grant's case. 6
tion based on gender reassignment). But cf Rees v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9532/81, 9
Eur. H.R. Rep. 56 (1986); Cossey v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10843/84, 3 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 622 (1990) (holding that a transgendered person does not have the right to marry the
person of the same sex as the transgendered person's first sex).
254. Compare P, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-2149-50 (opinion of the Advocate-General) (considering the impact of the member countries' laws on this issue, as well as relating this to the
goals of the European Community) with supra Parts IV.A-B & V.A-B (discussing the
member countries' laws on same-sex partnerships and the impact discrimination of gays and
lesbians has on the European Community's goals).
255. See P, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-2149-50 (opinion of the Advocate-General) (describing the
results of the review of member states' laws on recognition of transgendered persons). The
Advocate-General examined the laws of the member countries and saw a "clear tendency,
especially since the early 1980s, towards even wider recognition of transsexuality, both by
legislation and by judicial decision." Id. The Advocate-General described how the laws of
some member states allow transgendered persons to correct birth certificates, marry, adopt
children and obtain a pension all in accordance with their new sexual identity. See Id. Arguably, the review of same-sex union laws would yield a similar holding in Grant.
256. See id. (reviewing the various laws of member countries regarding the rights of
transgendered persons).
257. See id.
258. See P, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-2162 (noting that the "equal treatment for male and female
workers constitutes one of the objectives of the Community, in so far as the harmonization
of living and working conditions while maintaining their improvement is to be furthered").
259. Id.
260. See P, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-2156 (opinion of the Advocate-General) (taking an expansive view of the Council directive). "The directive is nothing if not an expression of a general principles and a fundamental right.... [T]he directive should be construed in a broader
perspective, including therefore all situations in which sex appears as a discriminatory fac-
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By holding that the general purpose of the Council directive is to protect all people
when discrimination occurs related to sex (expanding beyond just male/female
discrimination), the European Court of Justice has provided an opportunity for
gays and lesbians to find protection under those directives and articles of the EC
Treaty that deal with sex discrimination in the workplaceP It is for these reasons
that P is a strong case supporting Lisa Grant's argument.'
The similarities between discrimination against homosexuals and transgendered
persons 6 should convince the European Court of Justice that gays and lesbians
are entitled to the same protections that transgendered persons receive under
Community law.
(1) South-West Trains Tries to Dismiss P
SWT tries to dismiss the relevance of P before presenting its legal submissions." SWT argues that because P dealt with transsexuals, its holding cannot be
relied on in Grant because Grant involves a homosexual, not a transsexual.26
tor." IdSee also infra note 262.
261. See P, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-2153-54 (opinion of the Advocate-General) (adopting a
strict male/female comparison disregarding any other irrelevant factors such as sexual orientation or transgendered status).
262. See P, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-2165 (defining the broad scope of the Council directive).
The "scope of the directive cannot be confined simply to discrimination based on [one's]
sex.... 'he scope of the directive is also such as to apply to discrimination arising, as in
this case, from the gender reassignment of the person concerned." Id
263. See idBut see Clapham & Veiler, supra note 11, at 31 (suggesting that "it would
be difficult to construe Directive 76/207/EEC on Equal Treatment for Men and WVomen...
as applying to lesbians and gay men").
264. But see Grant's Written Observations, supra note 6, at 6 n.6 (citing to P v. S and
CornwallCounty Council only once). Lisa Grant does not rely heavily on this case to make
her argument that sex should include sexual orientation. One reason could be that Lisa
Grant's case does not rely on Council Directives and instead focuses on Article 119 of the
EC Treaty. P on the other hand, does not rely on Article 119 of the Treaty. See P, 1996
E.C.R at 1-2145 (opinion of the Advocate-General). Both the Council directives and the EC
Treaty are equally binding on the member states, but in terms of equal treatment between
men and women the Council Directives and Article 119 focus on separate issues. See
STEINER, supra note 53, at 204-224 (explaining the protections the various Council directives provide). Specifically, Council Directive 76/207 provides equal treatment, in terms of
promotions, hiring, and terminations. See id at 204, 214-16. Thus, because the issue in P
focused on the termination of the transgendered person, the analysis in that case focused on
Council Directive 76/207. See P,1996 E.C.R. at 1-2145 (opinion of the Advocate-General).
Because Lisa Grant's case is specifically about equal pay, however, she relies more on Article 119 of the EC Treaty. See Grant's Written Observations, supra note 6, at 2-6; see also
STEINER, supra note 53, at 206-09.
265. See infranote 267 (explaining similarities of these two sexual minorities).
266. See SWT's Written Observations, supra note 161, at 4-5 (trying to dismiss the
relevance of P).
267. See id at 4 (noting that "[i]t has been suggested that the approach taken by the
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SWT argues that there is a difference between a person's sexual identity and their
sexual orientation."8 Yet, as SWT notes, in P, both the opinions of the European
Court of Justice and the Advocate-General focus on the principle of equality. 69
SWT attempts to discount this element of equality in the opinion, even suggesting
that "[t]he principle may be a guide to the correct interpretation of Community
legislation in disputed areas; but it cannot give rights in an arena where the Community has not legislated at all."27 It seems, however, that if the European Court
of Justice can rely on equality to determine that transgendered persons are protected in the workplace, they can reach a similar conclusion regarding a gay couple's right to employee benefits.
b. InternationalDecisions Which ConsiderSex Discriminationand
Sexual OrientationDiscriminationthe Same
Lisa Grant also relies on decisions from the Human Rights Committee expanding sex to include sexual orientation in terms of discrimination.2 1' The Human
Rights Committee, under the ICCPR,272 adopted an argument identical to Lisa
Grant's alternative
argument that sexual orientation is part of sex in Toonen v.
273
Australia.
The additional support on which Lisa Grant relies upon in making this arguCourt [of Justice] in [P] should be determinative in [Grant]. This is plainly wrong, because
the position of homosexuals cannot be equated to that of trans-sexuals."). But see generally
THIRD SEx, THIRD GENDER: BEYOND SEXUAL DIMoRPHISM IN CuLTuiRE AND HISTORY
(Gilbert Herdt ed., 1994) (finding similarities between these two sexual minorities). While a
transgendered person and a gay or lesbian person are not the same, in many ways the discrimination of these two groups is the same. See M.A. Rothblatt, An American Perspective
on TransgenderHealth Law, THE THRD PINK BOOK: A GLOBAL VIEW OF LESBIAN AND GAY
LmERATION AND OPPRESSION, supra note 96 (suggesting that the discrimination is the same
between these two groups of people and that the protections should be the same). Any distinction between transgendered persons and gay or lesbian persons, however, was not a
concern for the Advocate-General in his opinion in this case. See infra notes 303-327 and
accompanying text It is unlikely that the European Court of Justice would distinguish between these two groups, providing only transgendered persons with protection under Article
119.
268. See id. at 5 (suggesting a difference between transsexuals and homosexuals).
269. See id.
270. See id.
271. Grant's Written Observations, supra note 6, at 11. "The Human Rights Committee,
which interprets and applies the Covenant [ICCPR,] has ruled that the word 'sex' in Articles 2(l) and 26 of the Covenant 'is to be taken as including sexual orientation."' Id. (citing
Toonen v. Australia, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. No. 488, U.N. Doe. CCPR/c/50/D0488/1992
(1994)). See generally Brenda Sue Thorton, The New InternationalJurisprudence on the
Right to Privacy: A Head-On Collision with Bowers v. Hardwick, 58 ALB. L. REv. 725,
726-27 (1995) (discussing the relationship between the Human Rights Committee, the
ICCPR, and the United Nations).
272. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
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ment focuses on the desire and responsibility for tolerance and equal treatment 4
The cases supporting this argument stand for the proposition that the advancement
of equality of the sexes is a major goal 75 With the exception of the Human Rights
Committee's decision, however, none of these cases counsel cited specifically
makes the argument that "sex" discrimination language should include sexual orientation discrimination. Regardless, both P and Toonen support Lisa Grant's argument that sex discrimination protections under Community law can include sexual orientation discrimination.276 Based on either of Lisa Grant's arguments, the
European Court of Justice should conclude that employers can no longer treat gay
and lesbian partnerships unfairly in the workplace.
C. SOUTH-WEST TRAINS' ARGUMENTS
SWT raises several arguments in its Written Observations:
(1) The discrimination complained of is discrimination not on the ground of sex.
but on the ground of sexual orientation.
(2) Neither art. 119 of the E.E.C. Treaty nor the Equal Treatment Directive prohibits discrimination on the grounds of sexual preference.
(3) The denial to same-sex partners of benefits given to spouses (or common-law
spouses) cannot be treated as discrimination because the status of an opposite-sex
marriage cannot be equated with that of a same-sex relationship.
(4) Even if the difference in treatment of same-sex and opposite-sex employees
can be analyzed as discrimination, it is capable of beingjustified.
(5) The extension of the prohibitions against discrimination between men and
women contained in art. 119 and the Equal Treatment Directive to discrimination
against homosexuals would offend against the principle of legal certainty. 2n
SWT's first argument-the discrimination is based not on sex but sexual orientation-is incorrect. SWT argues that "[tiravel concessions are denied to same-sex
partners of either-sex: there is no distinction between the treatment of male homosexuals and female homosexuals."'2 This type of comparison failed in the Southampton Industrial Tribunal and before the European Court of Justice in the P

274. See Abdulaziz v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 9214/81, 9473/81, 9474/81, 7 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 471 (1985); Schmidt v. Germany, App. No. 13580/88, 18 Eur. H.R. Rep. 513
(1994).
275. See supra note 274 and accompanying text (noting cases which support the argument that equality of the sexes is a major goal).
276. See supranotes 271-273 and accompanying text (describing Lisa Grant's reliance
on Toonen, which held that the ICCPR's definition of sex discrimination was broad enough
to include sexual orientation discrimination).
277. SWT's Written Observations, supra note 161, at 5-6.
278. Id at 7.
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case.279 "The employer who said that a sexual relationship with Mr. Potter is con-

duct permissible in a female employee but conduct impermissible in a male employee has clearly differentiated in treatment of male and female employees."2 t0
The second argument SWT raises is that neither Article 119, nor the Equal
Treatment Directive prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation. While
this is true, SWT fails to realize that the proper comparison between Lisa Grant
and a male in her position, indicates discrimination based on sex and is thus subject to the protections of both Article 119 and Council Directive 76/207.81 If that
argument fails, the alternative is that the European Court of Justice has already expanded the definition of sex in sex discrimination.282 It appears now that SWT is
trying to confine protections, which the European Court of Justice already has expanded. It seems that either of these arguments indicates how SWT's second argument fails; sex or gender means more than just sex or gender."'
Next, SWT argues that "the status of an opposite-sex marriage cauinot be

279. See supra note 231 and accompanying text (discussing how both the Southampton
Industrial Tribunal and the European Court of Justice concluded that the proper comparison
is between the party raising the discrimination issue and a person of the opposite sex, without considering their original gender, in the case of a transgendered, person or sexual orientation).
280. Grant's Written Observations, supra note 6, at 19 (quoting DAVID PANNICK, SEX

203 (1985)).
281. See Grant's Written Observations, supra note 6, at 5.
282. See discussion supra Part VI.B.2.a (examining in detail the European Court of Justice's ruling in P and how the Court of Justice broadly interpreted the definition of sex, expanding it to protect transgendered persons).
283. But does it mean sexual preference? SWT cites cases, other than P, to suggest that
sex is limited to discrimination based on a person's gender. See SWT's Written Observations, supra note 161, at 8-10; see, e.g., De Santis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979). SWT relies on a statement made by the President of the
Commission, Jacques Delors, which SWT believes shows the European Court of Justice's
inability to expand the protections of Council Directive 76/207 and Article 119 to gays and
lesbians. See SWT's Written Observations, supra, note 161, at 9-10. Delors stated, in an
answer to a written question in the European Parliament:
The Community has no powers to intervene in respect of possible discrimination by the Member
States against sexual minorities. The powers deriving from the Treaties enable it intervene only in
the event of discrimination because of nationality and to ensure equal treatment of male and female workers inemployment relationships with regard to social security.
Id. at 10 (emphasis supplied). Clearly, this statement, made in 1988, failed to include the
role of the European Court of justice, which has used its powers to deal with possible discrimination against sexual minorities. See P, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-2160-65. This suggests that
protections for these minorities are most likely going to come from the Court of Justice and
not the other Community institutions. SWT also suggests that "[r]espondent believes that in
most member states it has not been thought appropriate to enact legislation prohibiting discrimination against homosexuals in the field of employment." SWT's Written Observations,
supra note 161, at 10. That is not true. See discussion supra Parts V.A, V.B, and V.C (indicating the growth of laws prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace and
recognition of same-sex unions throughout the European Community and the world).
DiSCRMuNATION
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equated with that of a same-sex relationship."' "It is submitted only that [samesex partnerships] are not, from the point of view of society, the same or equiva-

lent." ' Such an argument ignores, however, the numerous laws in Europe and in
European Community member countries that recognize same-sex partnerships.'
The respondent, SWT, asks the Court of Justice to consider and "recognize the
special status accorded in British society. .. to marriage between a man and a
woman... which is rooted in the traditional concept of the family."' SWT questions whether a same-sex relationship is equivalent to marriage. 2
SWT continues its argument by suggesting that there is no "consensus within
the member states as to the extent to which stable relationships between homosexuals can be regarded as equivalent to a same-sex-marriage." ' If a member
country recognizes de facto marriages, what about countries that have legally recognized partnerships? Clearly, a marriage license is not the determining factor,
perhaps it is a legal partnership or maybe only a committed relationship. Furthermore, the respondent, SWT, admits that it has not conducted an up-to-date survey
of same-sex partnership laws within the member countries.
SWT's argument fails in that the European Court of Justice does not need a
consensus among member states regarding same-sex partnerships in order to protect same-sex couples in the workplace. For example, the Advocate-General in P
reviewed various member country laws regarding the treatment of transgendered
O
persons.
' There was no consensus among all member states about how to treat or
how to legally recognize a transgendered person.' For example, with regard to
official documents, i.e. birth certificates and driver's licenses, some countries allow the transgendered person to change their gender, while some do not. 3 This
lack of consensus, however, did not keep the Advocate-General from finding that a
transgendered person was protected by Council Directive 761207.'
SWT failed to fully develop its fourth argument-Justification. Instead, SVT

284. SWT's Written Observations, supra note 161, at 12.
285. Id
286. See supra Part V.A (discussing in detail the laws of Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway, Iceland, and Hungary, as well as bills being considered in Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Spain, Finland and Portugal).
287. SWT's Written Observations, supra note 161, at 12 (arguing that a same-sex partnership is not equivalent to a marriage between a heterosexual couple).
288. See id
289. SWT's Written Observations, supra note 161, at 14. Although Parts V.A, V.B, and
V.C suggest that a consensus is growing in the member countries, perhaps the European
Court of Justice should take this opportunity to establish a uniform view on this subject.
290. See id For an up-to-date survey of same-sex partnership laws in Europe, see supra
Part V.A.
291. See P, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-2149-50 (opinion of the Advocate-General) (analyzing the
various member country laws relating to recognition and status oftransgendered persons).
292. See id
293. See id
294. See id
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suggests that "[tihe factors relied on as constituting such justification are ... the
same as those relied on [in its third argument about same-sex partnerships]." This
Comment, however, suggests that because there is an advancing trend in the recognition of same-sex partnerships and of protections of sexual minorities in the
workplace, that there is no justification for unequal treatment of gays and lesbians.
Lisa Grant's Written Observations suggest that there is no justification for this
discrimination, especially not an employer's moral beliefs.295 SWT's justification
is based on morality, as well as the lack of laws protecting gay and lesbian couples. SWT argues that it is just for SWT to discriminate against Lisa Grant in Great
Britain.296 Lisa Grant suggests that this type of justification could "compromise the
equality of competitive conditions between companies [and would] permit the employer to reduce labour costs by denying equal pay conditions for all of its workers."297 Furthermore, according to the Southampton Industrial Tribunal's findings,
SWT did not suggest any economic or organizational justification for this discrimination.29 SWT has failed to adequately justify this discrimination.
SWT's fifth argument suggests that if the European Court of Justice found that
Article 119 or the Equal Treatment Council Directive protects gays and lesbians,
this finding "would offend against the principle of legal certainty." 2 SWT suggests that even if the Court found that Article 119 protected Lisa Grant and her
partner, neither would "enjoy a directly enforceable Community right under that

295. See Grant's Written Observations, supra note 6, at 15-16 (asserting that it would be
"fundamentally wrong to allow an employer to invoke its conception of morality as a justification for denying equal treatment of its employees").
296. See SWT's Written Observations, supra note 161, at 16 (relying on its arguments
made in its submission (3) regarding the alleged lack of laws throughout the Community
protecting gays and lesbians or providing gays and lesbians with marital rights); see also
Grant's Written Observations, supra note 6, at 36 (citing Respondent's Outline Submissions
Before the Industrial Tribunal, para. 17) (noting that SWT's justification for the unequal
treatment is that treating gays and lesbian partnerships equally "is not one which has gained
general acceptance in British society."). "[F]or example, Parliament has not recognized homosexual marriages, nor has it outlawed discrimination against homosexuals. It is reasonable for [SWT] to take the view that in deciding what benefits to grant its employees it
should reflect what it believes to be current social norms." id. Yet, others in the British
transport industry including British Airways, London Underground, and European Passenger Service provide travel benefits to gay and lesbian partners. See id. at 41-42. Furthermore, while the government of Great Britain may not recognize same-sex partnerships, surveys in Great Britain indicate a continuing increase in the number of people who support
equal rights for gay men and lesbians. See id. at 42.
297. Grant's Written Observations, supra note 6, at 16-17 (relying on Case 43/75 Defrenne v. Sabena 1976 E.C.R. 455 and noting that one of the goals of Sabena was the prevention of competition distortions).
298. See Grant's Written Observations, supra note 6, at 35 (discussing the Southampton
Industrial Tribunal's findings regarding the justification argued by SWT). Lisa Grant argues
further that these two reasons, economic or organizational, are the only sufficient ways to
justify a claim of discrimination. See id.
299. SWT's Written Observations, supra note 161, at 17.
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article." 3° SWT argues that the discrimination must be "identified solely with the
aid of criteria based on equal work and equal pay."3'0 This argument suggests that
there must be parameters within which the European Court of Justice could determine whether there has been discrimination. 3 This Comment relies on the decision and reasoning in P, which suggests that the European Court of Justice does
not utilize these parameters, or if they do, the parameters are not as narrow as
SWT would like.
VII. THE ADVOCATE-GENERAL'S OPINION IN GRANT V SOUTHWEST TRAINS
This Comment has provided numerous factors that the European Court of Justice could consider in reaching its decision in Grant--the expansion of same-sex
partnership recognition in member countries, the member countries' protection of
gays and lesbians in the workplace, P v. S and CornwallCounty Council, a broad
interpretation and application of Article 119 of the EC Treaty, the goals of the
European Community and the European Court of Justice's responsibilities to the
Community in attaining those goals, and the ability and political power of the
European Court of Justice to address this issue concerning gays and lesbians. In
addition, Advocate-General Elmer recently delivered his opinion in this case.3" A
review of the Advocate-General's opinion is necessary for a thorough review of
this case. It is necessary to note, however, that it is unlikely that the European
Court of Justice's conclusion will stray far from the Advocate-General's conclusion. Even so, the European Court of Justice can consider the additional arguments
this Comment makes.

300. Id
301. See UL (relying on Sabena, 1976 E.C.R. 455).

302. See SWT's Written Observations, supra note 161, at 17 (asserting that in the absence of criteria to determine discrimination Lisa Grant is without a remedy). "[Tihe concept of a homosexual partnership is not-without criteria or procedures established by national law--capable of definition with sufficient certainty to form the basis for legal rights."
Id SWT supports its argument by quoting from the observations of Advocate-General Lenz
in Case 59/85 Reed v. Netherlands 1986 E.C.1. 1283: "If companions are to be treated in
the same way as spouses it is imperative to lay down limits, criteria, and conditions (in particular with regard to the duration and nature of the relationship). These are certainly a
matter for the legislature.... ." IM (citing Case 59/85 Reed v. Netherlands 1986 E.C.R.
1283, 1294). See also P, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-2165 (indicating the Court's broad interpretation
of the Council Directive on sex discrimination); Grant's Written Observations, supra note
6, at 23 (noting that "equality is one of the fundamental principles of the Community's legal
order."). Also, in P, the European Court of Justice reiterated its belief that the "equal treatment principle is to be broadly applied." Id at 25.
303. See Case C-249196 Grant v. South-West Trains, Ltd., Opinion of the Advocate-

General [hereinafter "AG's Opinion"].
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A. THE ADVOCATE-GENERAL'S REMARKS ON GENDER DISCRIMINATION
The Advocate-General relied heavily on the European Court of Justice's opinion in P v. S and CornwallCounty Council.l" The Advocate-General believed the
Court's ruling in that case "took a decisive step away from an interpretation of the
principle of equal treatment based on the [limited and narrow] traditional comparison between a female and a male employee." ' The expansion of this principle,
which the Advocate-General found in Article 119 and not in Council Directive
concluded that
76/207, is appropriate in the Grant case." 6 The Advocate-General
07
this reasoning, the reasoning in P, is applicable to the Grant case.
In reviewing the analysis of the P case the Advocate-General rejected SWT's
comparison of a gay man with a lesbian woman. °8 Instead, the Advocate-General
adopted the comparison in P.3" He interpreted the decision in P as applying Council Directive 76/207 to discrimination that was 'based essentially, if not exclusively, on the sex of the person concerned."'"" 0 The transgendered status of the
employee in P became irrelevant, just as the homosexuality becomes irrelevant in
Grant."' By irrelevant the Advocate-General suggested that the scope of Article
119 in Grant, or Council Directive 76/2073"2 in P, is not limited to discrimination
"based on the fact that a person is of one or [the] other sex." ' Instead, he concluded that the European Court of Justice's reasoning in P now allows a broader
interpretation of the "Community principle of equal treatment in a way that renders the principle appropriate for dealing with the cases of gender discrimination
that come before the courts in present-day society."3" 4 Those cases in present-day
society, are cases where the employer discriminates against their employees not
necessarily based on their gender alone, but perhaps their gender and the gender of
their partner, or their siblings, parent or dependent."1 5

304. See AG's Opinion, supra note 303, at 1-3 - 1-5 (discussing in detail the P decision
and how the Advocate-General interprets it).
305. Id. at 1-4.

306. See id. (noting that the European Court of Justice refused to confine the equal
treatment principle to "discrimination based on the fact that a person is of one or [the] other
sex.").

307. See id
308. See id. at 1-5.

309. See id at 1-4- 1-5.
310. Id. at1-3-I-4.
311. See AG Opinion, supra note 303, at 1-3 - 1-4 (interpreting P as finding the transsexual or transgendered status of the employee as irrelevant).
312. The Advocate-General concluded that 76/207 does not apply in the Grant case,
whereas Article 119 does, because 76/207 does not deal with pay benefits. See id. at 1-3.
The questions in the Grant case, therefore, should be answered based on Article 119.
313. Id at 1-4 (citation omitted).
314. Id
315. See id at 1-5 (describing various hypothetical situations in which the sexual orientation of the employee is irrelevant, but where employees are protected from such discrimination).
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B. GENDER DISCRIMfNATION IN GRANT v. SOUTH-WEST TRAINS, LTD.

The Advocate-General reviewed, in detail, SWT's ticket regulations in reaching
his conclusion that SWT's actions constituted discrimination under Article 119 of
the EC Treaty.3" 6 Essentially, he looked specifically at ticket regulation 8 which
provided travel benefits for "cohabitee's being of the 'opposite sex' to the employee."3 7 Based on the exact language it is obvious that "[g]ender is simply the
only decisive criterion in the provision" 3 8" He continued by indicating that this requirement could only be met by a consideration of the gender of both the employee and his or her partner." 9 Based on this the Advocate-General concludes:
That a provision in an employer's pay regulations under which the employee is
granted travel concessions for a cohabitee of the opposite sex to the employee but
refused such concessions for a cohabitee of the same sex as the employee constitute discrimination on the basis of gender which falls within the scope of Article
119.320

The Advocate-General's opinion indicates that he adopts both arguments made
by Lisa Grant. First, he adopts the interpretation of P that Article 119 is no longer
limited to discrimination based solely on a comparison between the treatment of a

316. See id at 1-5 - 1-7 (reviewing the various clauses of the ticket regulations, noting
discrepancies between SWT's stated reasons for the discrimination and the language of the
ticket regulations). Interestingly, the Advocate-General noted that S\VT's stated goal was to
prevent gays and lesbians from obtaining these benefits. See discussion, supra note 303 at I6. Ticket regulation 8 states "Privilege tickets are granted for one common law opposite sex
spouse of staff... subject to a statutory declaration being made that a meaningful relationship has existed for a period of two years or more. .. " kd at 1-1. Yet, ticket regulation 12
indicates that "'Privilege tickets may be issued ...for a relative acting as a bona fide permanent resident housekeeper to and entirely dependent upon the applicant...' if the employee is either living alone or with an invalid spouse."
317. IdatI-6.
318. Id
319. See id (adopting the view that both parties' sex or gender are considered by the
employer in determining whether or not the employee's cohabitee is entitled to the travel
benefits).
320. Id at 1-7. The Advocate-General suggested that the Court of Justice reply to the
questions posed by this case as follows:
(1) A provision in an employer's pay regulations under which the employee is granted a pay benefit in the form of travel concessions for a cohabitee of the opposite gender to the employee, but
refused such concessions for a cohabitee of the same gender to the employee, but refused such
concessions for a cohabitee of the same gender as the employee, constitutes discrimination on the
basis of gender, which is contrary to Article 119 of the EC Treaty.
(2) Such discrimination on the basis of gender cannot be justified by reference to the fact that the
employer's intention is to confer benefits on heterosexual couples as opposed to homosexual cou-

ples.
(3)Article 119 of the EC Treaty is directly applicable and it is for the national courts to ensure
that the disadvantaged group ofemployees is treated in the same was as the favoured group.
Id at 1-12.
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man with the treatment of a woman. Second, the Advocate-General adopts the
factual discrimination argument that Lisa Grant raised, that she was discriminated
against as a woman, because a man inher situation would have (and did) receive
benefits denied her, because of her gender in relation to the gender of her partner. 2' Having concluded that this is discrimination under Article 119, is it justifiable in anyway?
C. JUSTIFICATION FOR DISCRIMINATION

The Advocate-General distinguishes between direct and indirect discrimination. 22 In the Grant case, the Advocate-General concluded that the discrimination
was direct, because it was a result of the specific language in the ticket regulations.3" This type of discrimination cannot be justified by reference to objective
circumstances.324 Even if the Court considered justifications for the discrimination

in the Grant case, the Advocate-General fails to accept SWT's reason or justification for treating gays and lesbians in a discriminatory manner as a reasonable justification.325 SWT's reason for denying gays and lesbians this benefit is its desire not
to promote homosexuality based on its conception of morality.326 The AdvocateGeneral notes that that type of justification constitutes "a purely subjective reason
as opposed to objective circumstances such as, for instance, actuarial calculations
relating to the value of contributions paid in under certain forms of pension arrangements in relation to average life expectancy for men and women." '27 Thus,
SWT's justification argument should fail not only because it is direct discrimination which cannot be justified, but because even if it is indirect discrimination the
justification given for it is not sufficient to allow this discrimination to continue.
The Advocate-General's opinion accepts many of the arguments put forward by
321. See id. at 1-6 (noting that "[t]ravel concessions for a male cohabitee may only be
obtained if the employee is a woman .... [and tiravel concessions for a female cohabitee
may only be obtained if the employee is a man.").
322. See id. at 1-9 (distinguishing between direct and indirect discrimination). The Advocate-General noted that direct discrimination is discrimination that results directly from
"the legal criterion." Id. For, example in the Grant case, the discrimination occurred because the ticket regulation provided the benefit to opposite-sex cohabitees. See id. This is
direct discrimination. See id. Indirect discrimination results not from the language of a law
or legal criteria, but instead results from the application or practice of that law or regulation.

See id.
323. See id. (noting that "gender discrimination results directly from the legal criterion
laid down in Clause 8 of the Ticket Regulations").
324. See id. (noting that "according to the Court's case-law such direct discrimination

cannot be justified by reference to objective circumstances"). "Only where discrimination is
indirect does the Court appear to accept the possibility that it might be justified by reference
to objective circumstances." Id. (footnote omitted).
325. See id. at 1-9 (noting that SWT's reasons are subjective as opposed to a reasonable
objective circumstance which would lend to this unequal treatment of gays and lesbians).
326. See id.
327. Id at 1-9-1-10.
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Lisa Grant. It clearly holds that SWT's actions are discriminatory under Article
119. It is extremely likely that the European Court of Justice will deliver an opinion similar to the Advocate-General's. This Comment suggests that based on the
analysis above, it should follow the Advocate-General's opinion. It could at the
same-time rely on the additional arguments raised in this Comment that have not
been addressed by the Advocate-General's opinion.
VIII. RECOMMENDATION
Lisa Grant's analysis is compelling.3" Many intergovernmental organizations
and judicial bodies have created laws and passed decisions providing protections
for gays and lesbians,329 which the European Court of Justice often considers in its
decisions 3 In addition, numerous countries both within and outside the European
Community have passed legislation that legally recognizes same-sex partnerships
and protects gays and lesbians in the workplace 33 ' These laws show the level and
degree of social understanding and acceptance of gays and lesbians that the European Court of Justice should consider in reaching its decision.
In addition to member countries' laws on this issue, the European Court of Justice can rely on its own prior decisions, specifically its holding in P"2 and adopt
the Advocate-General's opinion in Grant.333 In Grant, the Court can follow its decision in P,expanding further its already broad interpretation of sex discrimination
to protect gays and lesbians. Even if the European Court of Justice fails to expand
the definition of sex discrimination, it can conclude, based on the facts, that the
actions by SWT violated Article 119 because it treated a woman differently than a
man without legitimate justification.
This Comment articulates numerous factors favoring a finding that SVT's actions constituted discrimination, not only against a lesbian but against a same-sex
couple. No other European Community institution has the power to implement a
such a pro-gay decision, combined with the political ability to freely carry out such
a decision 34 Moreover, finding in favor of Lisa Grant would be well grounded in

328. See discussion supra Part VI.B (discussing Lisa Grant's arguments).

329. See Grant's Written Observations, supra note 6, at 14 n.1 (noting the pro-gay decisions by the European Court of Human Rights).
330. See, e.g., supra Part ll.D.I and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights).
33 1. See supra Parts V.A, V.B, & V.C.

332. See discussion supra Part VI.B.2.a (describing P and the close parallels of that case
to the Grant case).
333. See discussion supraPart VII.

334. See discussion supraPart III.A. But see Ball, supra note 94, at 387-88 (noting that
"[it isperhaps now up to the political system and the national and Community leaders, and
not so much up to the legal system and judges, to build upon the edifice constructed by the
Court in order to achieve successfully a community of nations that is both economically and
socially integrated.").
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precedent of the European Court of Justice. 35 The European Court of Justice
should find for Lisa Grant in order to: 1) promote the achievement of the goals of
the European Community by treating all workers equally regardless of sexual orientation;3 6 2) to provide a unified European Community position on same-sex
unions, gays and lesbians in the workplace;3 and 3) to provide an interpretation of
the EC Treaty and Council directives that is consistent with the European Court of
Justice's prior decisions and the Council directives dealing with sex discrimination
in the workplace. 3 8
IX. CONCLUSION
This Comment provides several reasons why the European Court of Justice
should find in favor of Lisa Grant. The unique aspect of the Grant case is that the
discrimination involves a lesbian couple. A pro-gay decision would positively affect treatment of gays and lesbians in the workplace, and, at the same time, it can
begin a discussion of the growing trend among member countries to afford gay
and lesbian partnerships legal recognition. When all the factors are considered it is
clear that the European Court of Justice should answer the questions, which the
South Hampton Industrial Tribunal sent to it, in such a way as to ensure protection
for all gays and lesbians in the workplace. At the same time, this case can help to
recognize the growth of legally sanctioned same-sex partnerships in the European
Community.

335. See discussion supra Part VI.B.2.a (discussing generally P, Sabena and the goal of
the European Court of Justice in providing equal rights and treatment to people in the
workplace).
336. See discussion supra Part IV (describing the goals of the European Community and
the case law in which the European Court of Justice has found in favor of a particular party
in order to move toward achievement of the overall goals of the European Community as
outlined in the EC Treaty).
337. See discussion supra Part V.A (describing the growth of legal recognition of samesex partnerships by countries throughout Europe).
338. See discussion supra Part VI.B.2.a; P, 1996 E.C.R. at 1-2153 (opinion of the Advocate-General) (suggesting a broad interpretation of the current discrimination laws to be
more inclusive and protective of all sexual minorities).

